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1
The DTSA’s Federalism Problem: 
Federal Court Jurisdiction over  
Trade Secrets 
Conor Tucker* 
The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”) greatly 
expanded federal protection of trade secrets. But how many trade 
secrets were “federalized”? The short answer is: many, but not all. 
At the heart of the DTSA lies a mammoth jurisdictional problem: 
Congress only federalized certain trade secrets. Unlike copyrights 
and patents, Congress has no independent constitutional basis to 
regulate trade secrets. Instead, like trademarks, trade secrets are 
regulated under the commerce clause and must satisfy a 
jurisdictional element, which requires a nexus between interstate 
commerce and trade secrets. But unlike trademarks, Congress 
chose not to legislate to the fullest extent of its commerce clause 
power, excluding some trade secrets from federal protection. In 
short, the DTSA’s jurisdictional element ensures that only 
“technical” trade secrets—i.e., formulae, manufacturing 
processes, etc.—qualify for federal protection. “Business 
information” secrets are protected, if at all, only under state law. 
This Article is the first to explain the DTSA’s jurisdictional 
element in depth and explore its practical and theoretical 
implications. Interpretation of the jurisdictional element in the 
DTSA is the Act’s key judicial dilemma. The jurisdictional element 
imposes two requirements on a federal plaintiff’s trade secret: (1) 
that the trade secret closely relates to a product or service; and (2) 
that the product or service actually flows in interstate commerce. 
                                                                                                             
*  Associate, Irell & Manella LLP. J.D., Northwestern University Pritzker School of 
Law. Master of Philosophy, University of Oxford. The Author is indebted to thoughtful 
comments, feedback, and criticism received from Professor David Schwartz, Professor 
Sharon Sandeen, Professor Matthew Kugler, Professor Laura Pedraza-Fariña, David 
Lurie, Moon Hee Lee, and Beau Tremitiere. 
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As a practical matter, the old trade secret tort has been split in 
two—with technical trade secrets federalized and business 
information remaining protected solely by state law. Theoretically, 
this interpretation brings trade secret policy in line with other 
species of federal intellectual property policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 11, 2016, President Obama signed into law the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”).1 By creating a federal civil 
remedy for trade secret misappropriation,2 the DTSA became one 
of the most important expansions of federal intellectual property 
protection since the Lanham Act.3 Before the DTSA, state law 
dominated the protection of trade secrets (although federal courts 
often heard trade secret cases in diversity). Because the vast 
majority of states had enacted part or all of the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act (“UTSA”), 4  trade secret law was fairly uniform. 5 
However, the Senate Report on the DTSA indicates that some 
state-law differences remained case-dispositive.6 At the same time, 
the cost of trade secret theft to U.S. businesses has been 
approximated at between one-and-three percent of the U.S. gross 
domestic product (“GDP”). 7  Congress passed the DTSA and 
                                                                                                             
1 See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
2 See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)–(d) (West, 
Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) (amending Economic Espionage Act of 1996 
(EEA), 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012)). 
3 Notwithstanding the curious statement in the DTSA that the Act “shall not be 
construed to be a law pertaining to intellectual property for purposes of any other Act of 
Congress,” trade secrets in general make the most sense when viewed through the 
theoretical lens of intellectual property. DTSA § 1836, 130 Stat. at 382. See Mark A. 
Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
311, 313 (2008); infra Conclusion, Section A. (discussing the theoretical foundations of 
federal trade secret law). But see Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade 
Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1804 (2014) (expressing doubt as to whether “there is 
a normative basis for a freestanding trade secret law that is not parasitic on other  
legal norms”). 
4 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1979) (amended 1985). 
5 Forty-seven states have codified the UTSA in some form or another. See Legislative 
Fact Sheet - Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org
/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act [https://perma.cc/4LCB-
FNJA] (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). The EEA is the only other federal protection for trade 
secret misappropriation. See EEA § 1831 (criminalizing economic espionage); id. § 1832 
(criminalizing theft of trade secrets). 
6 See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2–3 (2016). 
7 See THE CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTER. & TRADE (CREATE.ORG) & 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLC, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRADE SECRET THEFT: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANIES TO SAFEGUARD TRADE SECRETS AND MITIGATE POTENTIAL 
THREATS 9 (2014). According to a 2011 study by the Ponemon Institute, the median 
annualized cost of cybercrime alone to each in a set of benchmark companies totaled $5.9 
million a year. THE COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., THE IP 
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provided a federal civil remedy to cure the ineffectiveness of the 
prior federal criminal trade secret statute.8 
Scholars agree that the most important question presented by 
the DTSA is the interstate commerce requirement. Professor 
Elizabeth Rowe has singled out jurisdictional elements, including 
the interstate commerce requirement, as a key interpretive issue 
still  open  in  federal  court.9  Professors  Sharon  Sandeen  and 
Christopher Seaman, in a forthcoming article canvassing four 
important issues of statutory interpretation raised by the DTSA, 
also single out the interstate commerce requirement as a key 
issue. 10  Specifically Sandeen and Seaman identify the essential 
tension between a broad and narrow interpretation of the 
jurisdictional element, 11  which this Article explores in greater 
detail. The jurisdictional element is at the core of interpreting the 
DTSA because the scope of the entire Act turns on the scope of the 
commerce power exercised by Congress.12 This Article provides a 
principled look at the proper interpretation of the DTSA’s 
jurisdictional element. 
                                                                                                             
COMMISSION REPORT 43 (2013), http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission
_Report_052213.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3BL-LTNM]. 
8 See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2–3. 
9 Camilla Hrdy, Major Issues in Trade Secret Law: Part 1, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
(Apr. 28, 2017, 11:21 AM), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2017/04/major-issues-
in-trade-secret-law-part-1.html [https://perma.cc/TSF4-28X3] (citing Elizabeth Rowe, 
Professor, Univ. of Fla., The New Era of Trade Secret Law: The DTSA and other 
Developments, Remarks at Trade Secret Conference (April 21, 2017)  
(transcript unavailable)). 
10 Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of 
Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 40) (on 
file with authors). 
11 Id.; see also infra Section IV.A.1. 
12 While no court has explicitly construed the jurisdictional element, the two district 
courts addressing the issue have come to complementary conclusions. Cf. Garfield Beach 
CVS LLC v. Mollison Pharmacy, No. 17-cv-00879-AJB-MDD, 2017 WL 3605452, at *3 
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2017) (holding that where the question of whether the plaintiff’s trade 
secrets traveled in interstate commerce is factually contested, the defendant must raise the 
issue in a summary judgment motion, not a motion to dismiss); Grow Fin. Fed. Credit 
Union v. GTE Fed. Credit Union, No. 8:17-cv-1239-T-30JSS, 2017 WL 3492707, at *3 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2017) (ruling that financial products sold throughout the United 
States are “sufficient at this [pleading] stage to establish a nexus between the trade secrets 
that were allegedly misappropriated and interstate commerce,” overcoming the 
defendant’s jurisdictional objection). 
6          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:1 
 
This Article suggests that, when correctly interpreted, the 
DTSA’s jurisdictional element13 is narrow. More specifically, this 
Article’s textual and contextual analysis of the jurisdictional 
element reveals that the DTSA creates a two-tiered system for the 
protection of trade secrets, relying on both state and federal 
substantive law. In short, the narrowness of the jurisdictional hook 
favors federal protection for technical trade secrets (formulae, 
manufacturing processes, etc.), while generally relegating business 
information (financials, strategies, customer information) to state 
remedies.14 Thus, the DTSA represents a cautious expansion of 
federal intellectual property rights, keenly balancing the myriad 
state law interests in certain trade secrets against the need  
for uniformity.15 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background 
on the DTSA and discusses this Article’s interpretive 
methodology. Part II construes the Nexus Requirement and Part III 
construes the Relationship Requirement. Part IV applies the 
construction developed in this Article to hypothetical cases to test 
the boundaries of the jurisdictional element. The Conclusion 
briefly discusses the implications of this interpretation. 
I. BACKGROUND, HISTORY, AND TEXT OF THE DTSA 
The DTSA is not Congress’s first foray into trade secret law. In 
1996, Congress enacted the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”).16 
The EEA, motivated by perceived foreign government-sponsored 
corporate espionage and the lack of effective remedies under state 
law,17  provided for federal prosecution of individuals who 
misappropriated  trade  secrets.18  The  EEA  actually  criminalized  
two different types of conduct: (1) criminal corporate espionage 
(i.e., stealing trade secrets from a corporation); and (2) criminal 
economic espionage (i.e., stealing trade secrets for a foreign 
                                                                                                             
13 DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61). 
14 See infra Part III and Section IV.B.3. 
15 See infra Conclusion. 
16 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012). 
17 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4–6 (1996). 
18 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1832. 
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nation). 19  After two decades, Congress returned to trade secret 
misappropriation and passed the DTSA.20 
The DTSA amends the EEA in a few critical ways. First, the 
DTSA provides for a federal private civil cause of action for trade 
secret misappropriation.21 Second, the private civil cause of action 
includes an extraordinary new remedy: ex parte civil seizure, 
which allows plaintiffs to seize defendant’s property.22 Third, the 
DTSA made changes to the definitions section of the EEA.23 The 
DTSA added definitions for “misappropriation”24 and “improper 
means,”25  modeling  both  of  those  definitions on  the  UTSA 
definitions.26 The DTSA also tweaked the EEA’s initial definition 
of “trade secrets” to solve a circuit split that had developed under 
the EEA.27 
The DTSA relied heavily on statutory language already in 
place in the EEA. For instance, the bulk of the jurisdictional 
element came from the EEA’s criminal economic espionage 
                                                                                                             
19 Id. 
20 See generally S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014); Protecting American Trade Secrets and 
Innovation Act of 2012, S. 3389, 112th Cong. 
21 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)–(d) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) 
(amending EEA § 1836(b)). 
22 See id. § 1836(b)(2). 
23 Compare EEA § 1839, with DTSA § 1839 (adding definitions and  
modifying others). 
24 DTSA § 1839(5). 
25 Id. § 1839(6). 
26 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1)–(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1979)  
(amended 1985). 
27 A trade secret must be secret; it must “not be[] generally known . . . [or] readily 
ascertainable . . . .” Id. § 1(4). A critical question is from whom must the information be 
secret? The Third and Seventh Circuits disagreed over that question under the EEA. 
Compare United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating in dicta that 
one could say “the public” means “the economically relevant public” (emphasis in 
original)), with United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The EEA, 
however, indicates that a trade secret must not be generally known to, or readily 
ascertainable by, the general public, rather than simply those who can obtain economic 
value from the secret’s disclosure or use.”). The DTSA substitution sides with the 7th 
Circuit on this point. See DTSA, Pub. L. No. 114-153, sec. 2, § 1839, 130 Stat. 376, 380 
(2016) (removing “by the public,” and substituting “another person who can obtain 
economic value from the disclosure or use of the information”). 
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provision.28 Two separate panels of the Second Circuit disagreed 
over the meaning of this language in the EEA.29 These two cases 
are dealt with in greater detail in Part III.30 It suffices to say here 
that the confusion resulting from the Second Circuit’s conflicting 
panel decisions leaves the meaning of the DTSA’s jurisdictional 
element open for interpretation. 
A. Statutory Text 
The DTSA’s statutory text31 and legislative history32 clearly 
create a two-tiered system of state and federal trade secret 
protection. 33  Yet, the importance of this conclusion cannot be 
overstated, for it presents the question of its own enforcement. 
With two tiers of protection, how will “federal” and “state” trade 
secrets (or trade secret rights) be defined? The jurisdictional 
element answers that question because it bisects trade secret 
protection into federal and state law components. 
The jurisdictional element of the DTSA serves the essential 
function of sifting the cases by providing federal protection for 
certain trade secrets and leaving it to state law to protect other 
                                                                                                             
28 Compare EEA § 1832(a) (containing the EEA corporate espionage provision prior 
to the passage of the DTSA), and DTSA § 1832(a) (retaining the same provision), with 
id. § 1836(b) (containing the amended civil action provision). 
29 United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235, 264 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2012). 
30 See infra Section III.C.2. 
31 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1838 (containing the anti-preemption provision); cf. EEA 
§ 1836(b) (containing the jurisdictional element); S. 1890, 114th Cong. § (2)(f) (as 
reported by the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 29, 2015) (“Nothing in the amendments 
made by this section shall be construed to modify the rule of construction under section 
1838 of title 18, United States Code, or to preempt any other provision of law.”). 
32 See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10 (2016) (“[T]his Act is not intended to alter the 
balance of current trade secret law or alter specific court decisions.”). 
33 That two tiers of trade secret protection now exist is so uncontroversial that it often 
forms the starting-point for criticisms of the DTSA. See Christopher B. Seaman, The 
Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 317, 352–59 (2015); Letter 
from Professors in Opposition to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (S. 1890, H.R. 
3326), Eric Goldman et al., to Charles E. Grassley & Patrick J. Leahy, Chairmen, U.S. 
Senate Judiciary Comm., and Robert W. Goodlatte & John Conyers, Jr., Ranking 
Members, U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Comm. 6–8 (Nov. 17, 2015), 
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/2015%20Professors%20Letter%20in%20Opposi
tion%20to%20DTSA%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB3T-9KGV] (noting that the 
two-tiered system reduces uniformity) [hereinafter Letter from Goldman et al.]. 
2017]           THE DTSA'S FEDERALISM PROBLEM 9 
 
trade secrets: “An owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated 
may bring a civil action under this subsection if the trade secret is 
related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, 
interstate or foreign commerce.”34 The text of the provision makes 
clear that the jurisdictional element qualifies which trade secrets, as 
defined elsewhere in the statute, 35  support an action in federal 
court for trade secret misappropriation. The most important part of 
the jurisdictional element is that it provides a conditional cause of 
action: an owner may sustain a civil action under the DTSA “if the 
trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended 
for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.”36 This is the Qualifying 
Phrase, indicating which trade secrets qualify for protection under 
the DTSA. 
It is important to note that the Qualifying Phrase operates to 
narrow the scope of the DTSA on its own. Neither the UTSA 
(which forms the model for state trade secret statutes),37 nor state 
trade secret laws,38 qualify which trade secrets are actionable. The 
DTSA does. The implication for statutory interpretation is that 
trade secrets related to a product or service used in interstate 
commerce is a sub-set of all trade secrets in the United States. 
The Qualifying Phrase, in turn, consists of two requirements 
for a trade secret to be actionable under the DTSA: the Nexus 
                                                                                                             
34 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (emphasis added) (amending EEA § 1836(b)). 
35 Id. § 1839(3). 
36 Id. § 1836(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
37 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1979) (amended 1985) 
(defining trade secret). 
38 A complete catalogue of state trade secret statutes is not necessary here, but a review 
of a random sample of statutes turns up no Qualifying Phrase (or similar language). See, 
e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426−3426.11(West, Westlaw through Ch. 859 of 2017 Reg. 
Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-50 (2005); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/1 (1988); 12 PA. 
CONS. STAT. §§ 5301−5308 (2004); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.002 
(West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-336 (2009). Furthermore, common law jurisdictions 
do not require a connection to commerce or use in commerce or any relationship between 
the trade secret and a product. See also N. Atl. Instruments, Inc. v. Haber, 188 F.3d 38, 
40 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying New York law); Infinity Fluids Corp. v. Gen. Dynamics 
Land Sys., Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 294, 306−08 (D. Mass. 2016) (applying Massachusetts 
law); Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex. App. 1990) (governing 
misappropriation in Texas occurring before September 1, 2013). 
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Requirement and the Relationship requirement. 39  Both operate, 
independently, to narrow the DTSA’s scope, and both are 
structured around the “product or service.” The first is the “Nexus 
Requirement,” which requires that a product or service is “used in” 
“interstate  commerce.” 40   The  second,  the  “Relationship  
Requirement,” requires that the trade secret is “related to” the 
product or service. The primary contribution of this Article is to 
demonstrate the narrowness of the Nexus and Relationship 
                                                                                                             
39 A note on terminology. This Article uses the term “Relationship Requirement” to 
describe the connection between the trade secret and the product or service, and the term 
“Nexus Requirement” to describe the connection between the product or service and 
interstate commerce. The criminal corporate espionage provision of EEA § 1832, and the 
DTSA have structurally similar jurisdictional elements: both contain a first part 
(concerning the connection between the trade secret and a good), and a second part 
(concerning the relationship between that good and interstate commerce). Compare EEA, 
Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 1832(a), 110 Stat. 3488, 3489 (1996) (setting forth the original 
jurisdictional hook), with DTSA, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 1836(b)(1), 130 Stat. 37 (2016) 
(amending the EEA’s jurisdictional hook). The Second Circuit—the only federal circuit 
court to interpret the EEA’s initial jurisdictional element—used confusing terminology to 
describe the requirements, which this Article rejects. See United States v. Agrawal, 726 
F.3d 235, 244–48 (2d Cir. 2013). The Second Circuit uses the term “product 
requirement” to describe the connection between the product and interstate commerce, 
and the term “nexus provision” to describe the connection between the trade secret and 
the product. See id. at 244–45, 247. But this is backwards. For instance, the Supreme 
Court normally describes the connection between a thing or act and interstate commerce 
as a “nexus.” See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611–12 (2000) (noting 
that jurisdictional elements generally require a nexus between activity and interstate 
commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561–62 (1995) (noting that 
jurisdictional elements generally are interpreted to require a “nexus to interstate 
commerce”). Thus, it makes more sense to refer to the requirement that a product or 
service flow in interstate commerce as the “Nexus Requirement” rather than the  
“product requirement.” 
40 For ease of analysis, the term “used in, or intended for use in” is collapsed into 
“used in,” and the term “interstate or foreign commerce” is collapsed into “interstate 
commerce.” The difference between the shortened and full “used in” term is simply 
between current and future use in commerce. This in no way suggests that the term 
“intended for use in” is undeserving of its own analysis. See, e.g., Section IV.A.2 
(discussing the implications of the term “intended for use in”). The “interstate 
commerce” term can similarly be collapsed for the purpose of this analysis because both 
require flow of a product or service from one point (either inside a state/territory or 
outside of that state/territory) to another point (either inside another state/territory or 
outside of that state/territory). The critical similarity is the crossing of political 
boundaries by the product or service. This combination in no way suggests that “foreign 
commerce” does not warrant its own interpretation. Interstate commerce is not defined in 
the EEA or the DTSA. See generally EEA §§ 1831–1839; DTSA, 130 Stat. 376. 
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Requirements,41 and explore the implications of this narrowness 
for trade secret litigation under the DTSA.42 
B. Contributions and Implications 
This Article makes two concrete and novel contributions to 
legal literature. First, it provides a principled interpretation of the 
DTSA’s Qualifying Phrase and its two requirements, highlighting 
the essential role played by the jurisdictional element in the new 
system of trade secret protection. The interpretation offered by this 
Article—guided by significant textual and contextual evidence—
indicates that both the Nexus Requirement and the Relationship 
Requirement significantly narrow the breadth of the DTSA: The 
value of the plaintiff’s trade secret must be directly related to the 
plaintiff’s product or service, and the plaintiff’s product or service 
must  actually  flow  in  interstate  commerce.43  This  narrow 
interpretation operates to exclude certain trade secrets from  
federal protection. 
The implication of this interpretation is this Article’s second 
contribution: a taxonomy of actionable trade secrets under the 
DTSA.44 Not all trade secrets are actionable under the DTSA. The 
Qualifying Phrase acts as a sieve by enabling certain federal suits 
while relegating other trade secrets to state law. 
From this pair of contributions arise two implications. The first 
implication concerns the theoretical justification for federal trade 
secrets. Under the interpretation proposed herein, trade secrets sit 
snugly in the incentive-based panoply of federal intellectual 
property while leaving much of its state-law based commercial 
morality justification behind. The second implication concerns the 
                                                                                                             
41 See infra Parts II (discussing the narrowness of the Nexus Requirement), III 
(discussing the narrowness of the Relationship Requirement). 
42 See infra Part IV (introducing a taxonomy of federally-actionable trade secrets). 
43 See infra Sections II.E., III.D. 
44 This Article takes its definition of technical trade secrets and general business 
information from a pair of quantitative studies of trade secret litigation in state and 
federal court. See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret 
Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 71–73, 98 (2010) [hereinafter Almeling 
et al., State Study] (defining terms); David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of 
Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 304–05, 329 (2009) 
[hereinafter Almeling et al., Federal Study] (same). 
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way that the jurisdictional element creates a rift with state trade 
secret law, which is best seen through the concepts of “continuous 
use” and “negative information.”45 
Before its passage, the DTSA met significant scholarly 
resistance.46 Forty-two scholars signed an open letter to Congress 
in opposition to federalizing trade secrecy.47 The professors’ letter 
opposed the DTSA on four grounds: (1) potential abuse of the ex 
parte seizure provision;48 (2) the dangers of federalizing the trade 
secret doctrine of “inevitable disclosure”; 49  (3) the anticipated 
increase in cost of trade secret litigation;50 and (4) the Act’s failure 
to create uniformity.51 Professor Christopher Seaman argued that 
the DTSA may not even achieve its own aims—which he 
identified as uniformity, providing a federal forum, fulfilling 
international treaty obligations, and a national regime covering all 
major intellectual property laws 52 —while causing ripples of 
preemption.53 Professors David Levine and Sharon Sandeen argued 
in a recent article that the expansion of protection will generate 
                                                                                                             
45 See infra notes 312–18 and accompanying text. 
46 Congress responded to some of the following concerns by modifying the DTSA. For 
instance, it maintained uniformity in statutes of limitations by adopting a three-year 
statute of limitation, and avoided adopting the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Compare 
Letter from Eric Goldman et al., supra note 33, at 7 (noting a problem with the bill’s five-
year statute of limitations), and id. at 5 (noting that statutory language implicitly 
recognizes the inevitable disclosure doctrine), with DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(d) (West, 
Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-617) (amending EEA, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012)) 
(showing the final enacted version adopted a three-year statute of limitations), and id. 
§ 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (showing the final enacted version prohibits injunctions which 
prevent entry into an employment relationship). 
47 See Letter from Goldman et al., supra note 33, at 9–13. 
48 See id. at 2. 
49 See id. In its purest form, the inevitable disclosure doctrine allows a former 
employer to bar a former employee from working within the same industry as the former 
employer (or as competitors to the former employer), even absent threatened 
misappropriation, if the former employer persuades the court that the employee will 
“inevitably disclose” the secret. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271–72 
(7th Cir. 1995). Some states have rejected this remedy as a radical restraint on employee 
mobility and trade. See FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1275, 1277 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
50 See Letter from Goldman et al., supra note 33, at 2. 
51 See id. 
52 See Seaman, supra note 33, at 352–85. 
53 See David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 230, 244 (2014); Seaman, supra note 33, at 359–64. 
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“trolling” litigation54—a phenomenon already afflicting inventive 
incentives in the patent system.55 Professors Levine and Sandeen, 
along with Professor Zoe Argento, argued that the solution to any 
national cybercrime or cyber-espionage problem is not trade secret 
protection. 56  Levine and Sandeen argued, rather, that a better 
solution is the expansion and strengthening of existing provisions 
governing  cyber-espionage.57  Because  trade  secrets  are  tightly 
woven into balances struck by states between their fiduciary and 
contract law,58 federal preemption could easily upset this balance. 
However, the narrow interpretation of the jurisdictional 
element advanced by this article blunts much of the criticism of the 
DTSA. The jurisdictional element’s narrowing could reduce the 
incidence of trolling,59 control the cost of litigation,60 create greater 
uniformity as to technical trade secrets—while allowing legal 
diversity for the treatment of business information61—and reduce 
the potential for abuse of the ex parte seizure remedy.62 
                                                                                                             
54 See Levine & Sandeen, supra note 53, at 234. But see James Pooley, The Myth of the 
Trade Secret Troll: Why the Defend Trade Secrets Act Improves the Protection of 
Commercial Information, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1046–47 (2016). 
55 See Levine & Sandeen, supra note 53, at 231. 
56 See id. at 259–62; see generally Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: The 
Dangers of Strengthening Domestic Trade Secret Rights in Response to Cyber-
Misappropriation, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172 (2013–2014). 
57 See Levine & Sandeen, supra note 53, at 259–62. 
58 For a full discussion and examples, see infra notes 199–209 and accompanying text. 
59 Plaintiffs would be required to demonstrate that the trade secret directs value to a 
product or service, which would be incredibly difficult for a non-practicing entity. See 
infra Section III.D. 
60 Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a defense under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1), and may be resolved on the pleadings, thus greatly reducing the risk 
of abusive and unmeritorious lawsuits. 
61 Much academic resistance is centered on the inability, through non-preemption, of 
the DTSA to actually bring about uniformity. See, e.g., Letter from Goldman et al., supra 
note 33, at 6–8; Seaman, supra note 33, at 359–62. But federal law may preempt contrary 
state law regarding technical trade secrets, thereby creating uniformity, while leaving 
general business information non-preempted. See infra note 202. 
62 See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) 
(containing the ex parte civil seizure provision). The ex parte civil seizure provision—
which is not available at the state law level—allows plaintiffs to seize a putative 
defendant’s physical and digital material that allegedly contains trade secrets upon ex 
parte application to a court. See id. Under this Article’s interpretation, it would only be 
available for technical trade secrets, which are easier to define and seize than general 
business information. This reduces the risk of abuse of the civil seizure provision. 
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C. Interpretive Methodology 
This Article engages in statutory construction. In doing so, it 
takes its statutory interpretation cues from the Supreme Court. 
While the ascendency of textualism has clearly shaped the Court’s 
statutory interpretation jurisprudence, the differences between 
purposivism and textualism have become remarkably thin.63 The 
Court, rather than explicitly adopting textualism or purposivisim, 
has settled on a “middle ground” which represents an “equilibrium 
that greatly tempers judicial reliance on legislative history as a 
source of evidence while enhancing judicial attention to the text.”64 
The Court’s recent statutory interpretation jurisprudence 
indicates that this “middle ground” consists of three “buckets” of 
evidence, articulated here in rough relation to the corresponding 
strength of the evidence, which inform the meaning of a term: (1) 
the clear meaning of the statutory text (including accumulated 
meaning);65 (2) the intrinsic statutory context (statutory structure, 
related phrases, case law interpreting the term, etc.);66 and (3) the 
extrinsic context (legislative history, statutory purpose, impact of 
                                                                                                             
Cf. Paul M. Mersino, The DTSA’s Ex Parte Seizure Order: The “Ex” Stands for 
“Extraordinary” (Guest Blog Post), TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Feb. 1, 2017), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/02/the-dtsas-ex-parte-seizure-order-the-ex-
stands-for-extraordinary-guest-blog-post.htm [https://perma.cc/AL3D-JUHF] (canvasing 
the granted and denied ex parte orders and finding the bar for receiving them so high as 
to suggest rare success). 
63 See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV 1287, 1316 
(2010) [hereinafter Manning, Second-Generation]; John F. Manning, The New 
Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 141–47 (2011) [hereinafter Manning, New 
Purposivism]; Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV.  
1, 3 (2006). 
64 Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 63, at 1307. 
65 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) 
(Kennedy, J.) (“As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory 
text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material. Extrinsic materials have a 
role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting 
Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.”). Modern purposivists agree. 
See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1266 (2011). 
66 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (“So when deciding 
whether the language is plain, we must read the words ‘in their context and with a view to 
their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000))); see also Manning, New Purposivism, supra 
note 63, at 115–16; Molot, supra note 63, at 4. 
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interpretation on statutory ends, etc.).67 Importantly, judges often 
utilize intrinsic context to determine the “plain meaning” of the 
statutory text.68 Whether, when, and with what emphasis evidence 
in each bucket is used will vary judge-to-judge and court-to-court, 
and is subject to academic debate. But even textualists rely on 
context to help determine meaning.69 
This Article generally restricts itself to plain meaning and 
intrinsic statutory context (“buckets” (1) and (2)) when discussing 
construction of the Qualifying Phrase. Because of this restriction, 
this Article’s interpretation of the Qualifying Phrase does not vary 
whether one applies modern textualist or purposivist 
methodologies. Differences at the margins of these interpretive 
theories are not strictly relevant. The terms of the Nexus 
Requirement have accumulated a plain meaning in the case law 
interpreting  jurisdictional  elements.70  Disagreements  about  the 
meaning of the Nexus Requirement are better understood as 
debates concerning federalism,71 not statutory interpretation. The 
Relationship Requirement, however, is unique to federal law and 
has not developed a plain meaning. However, background canons 
of construction and intrinsic context encourage a narrow reading of 
the requirement.72 Both purposivists and textualists would utilize 
                                                                                                             
67 See, e.g., Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2215 (2011) (construing “reasonable 
attorney’s fees” in light of legislative purpose and judicial policy). 
68 Professor Jonathan Molot posits: 
Although at first glance this may seem like a meaningful distinction 
[i.e., looking to context before or after deciding on a plain meaning], 
upon closer analysis it is really just a matter of characterization or 
spin. If two interpreters use the same interpretive tools to reach the 
same interpretive result, does it really matter that one (the textualist) 
purports to use context to decide on a textual meaning while the other 
(the purposivist) admits that he is adjusting the text’s meaning to 
reconcile it with the context? 
See, e.g., Molot, supra note 63, at 4. 
69 See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting “[c]ontext always 
matters,” including the statutory structure and use of identical terms elsewhere in the 
same statute); Manning, Second-Generation, supra note 63, at 1309–10 n.101 (noting 
that textualists interpret statutes in context). 
70 See infra Sections II.A–E. 
71 See infra Conclusion. 
72 See infra Section III.A. 
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the proffered intrinsic context to define the ambiguous term 
“related to.”73 
II. THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT AND INTERSTATE TRADE SECRETS 
The Nexus Requirement of the DTSA insists that the plaintiff’s 
product or service be “used in, or intended for use in, interstate or 
foreign commerce.”74 This necessarily narrows the scope of the 
DTSA. As this Part demonstrates, the terms within the Nexus 
Requirement have acquired settled meanings since the 1940s, such 
that courts infer that “Congress means to incorporate the 
established  meaning  of  these  terms.”75  This  Part  applies 
established case law on congressional forbearance to the Nexus 
Requirement. Congressional forbearance occurs where Congress 
declines to legislate to the full breadth of its authority.76 Generally, 
Congress accomplishes this end in commerce clause enactments 
using certain statutory terms that have accumulated plain 
meanings. For instance, the omission of the term “affecting 
commerce”—or some “functional[] equivalent”—indicates that 
Congress did not invoke its full commerce clause power. Because 
the terms in the Nexus Requirement have a settled meaning in the 
case law, the Nexus Requirement itself is clear and unambiguous: 
it requires that the product or service actually flow in  
interstate commerce. 
                                                                                                             
73 See Molot, supra note 63, at 4. Extrinsic evidence is neither plentiful nor dispositive, 
but it does point to a narrow interpretation of the term “related to.” See infra Section I.A. 
Thus, to the extent that differences in the weight given to extrinsic context still exist 
between textualists and purposovists, they are not dispositive. 
74 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61). 
75 NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) (citing Perrin v. United States, 
444 U.S. 37, 42–43 (1979)). Textualism does not require a different result. See Manning, 
Second-Generation, supra note 63, at 1309–10 n.101 (“[T]extualists understand that 
semantic meaning depends on the conventions that a linguistic community shares for 
understanding language in context. For textualists, it includes not merely dictionary 
definitions, but also colloquial meanings, the technical definitions of terms of art, and 
background conventions associated with certain phrases or types of legislation.”). 
Interstate commerce terms are both terms of art in the legal profession and surrounded by 
a host of appropriate conventions. 
76 See BORRIS I. BITTKER & BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF 
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 5.06 (2d ed. 2013). 
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A. An Introduction to Congressional Forbearance 
The essence of congressional forbearance is contained in the 
intuition that Congress need not exercise the entirety of its 
commerce power whenever it legislates under the commerce 
clause.77  The  Supreme  Court  recognizes  this  fact  when  it 
distinguishes between statutes that “invok[e] Congress’ full 
[commerce] power,” and statutes that employ “limiting” language 
constraining the exercise of its commerce power.78  Put simply, 
Congress can employ statutory language to narrow a  
statute’s reach. 
At the full scope of its power, Congress can regulate purely 
intrastate activities, so long as the activities are economic in 
character and have, in their aggregate, a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.79 However, this describes the constitutional 
scope of Congressional power. The statutory scope of a particular 
commerce clause enactment is a different matter. Congress can use 
statutory language to regulate to its full constitutional extent,80 or it 
can forbear its full power and instead regulate only a subset of the 
activity  that  it  has  the  power  to  control.81  Congressional 
forbearance is a matter of statutory construction, not constitutional 
authority. Congress signals the extent of its regulation through 
jurisdictional elements and definitions of the term “interstate 
commerce” in statutes.82  Activities that lie within the ambit of 
Congress’s constitutional commerce power may, in fact, fall 
outside the statute’s language. 
Three principal considerations determine the scope of a statute 
under its jurisdictional element. The first is the presence or absence 
                                                                                                             
77 See id. 
78 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 856–57 (2000). 
79 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (2015). See generally, e.g., King 
v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
80 See Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 570 (1943) (“Congress did not 
exercise in this Act the full scope of the commerce power.” (emphasis added)). 
81 See, e.g., McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 658–59 (1982); United States v. 
Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 282–83 (1975). 
82 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (invoking a narrower definition of “interstate 
commerce” requiring the crossing of state lines in title 18—i.e., “commerce between one 
State . . . and another State . . .”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012) (exerting the full 
extent of congressional power over “[e]stablishments affecting interstate commerce”). 
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of the term “affecting . . . commerce.”83 The second is that other 
statutory terms may operate as the “functional equivalent” of the  
term  “affecting . . . commerce.” 84   Functionally  equivalent  
language, despite omitting the term “affecting . . . commerce,” 
generally invokes the full breadth of congressional commerce 
power.85 The third consideration is explicit limiting language, such 
as the term “used in.” Limiting language, when included in a 
statute, indicates a narrowed exercise of congressional  
commerce power.86 
B. Omission of the Term “Affecting . . . Commerce” 
Congress invokes its full commerce clause power by including 
the term “affecting . . . commerce” in the statutory text. 87  The 
term’s significance and meaning has, as the cases below indicate, 
become so clear that its absence implies that Congress meant to 
exercise something less than the full extent of its power. Two cases 
illustrate how the omission of the term “affecting . . . commerce” 
narrows the scope of statutes. 
The first case involves the Clayton Antitrust Act, an 
amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act. In 1975, section 7 of the 
Clayton Act read as follows: 
No corporation engaged in commerce shall 
acquire . . . the whole or any part of the stock or 
other share capital . . . of another corporation also 
engaged in commerce . . . [where] the effect of such 
acquisition may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.88 
In United States v. American Building Maintenance 
Industries, 89  prosecutors sought to enforce this section against 
American Building Maintenance Industries (ABMI), “one of the 
                                                                                                             
83 See, e.g., Walling, 317 U.S. at 570. 
84 See infra Section II.D. 
85 See infra Section II.D. 
86 See infra Section II.C. 
87 See Walling, 317 U.S. at 570. 
88 United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 275 (1975)  
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1975)). 
89 422 U.S. 271. 
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largest suppliers of janitorial services in the country,” over the 
acquisition of two southern California janitorial firms.90  ABMI 
was “unquestion[ably]” involved in interstate commerce. 91  At 
issue, however, was whether the two acquired companies were 
“engaged in commerce” within the meaning of the Clayton Act.92 
This required the Court to construe the term “in commerce,” which 
the government argued should be defined as co-extensive with 
congressional power over commerce.93 In support of this argument, 
the  government  cited  legislative  history,94   and  purported  
similarities to the Sherman Act (which reached the fullest extent of 
congressional power).95 
The Court disagreed and construed the term as a limited 
exercise  of  congressional  commerce  power.96  The  term  “in 
commerce” captured only those entities, persons, or things that 
“engaged in the flow of interstate commerce, and was not intended 
to reach all corporations engaged in activities subject to the federal 
commerce power.”97  The Court reached this conclusion for the 
following reasons. First, the Court had previously construed the 
term “in commerce” to be a narrow exercise of congressional 
power. 98  Second, contrary to the government’s contention, the 
differences—and not the similarities—between the Clayton and 
Sherman Acts were dispositive.99 In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving 
Co.,100 the Court decided that section 1 of the Clayton Act, which 
defined commerce as “trade or commerce among the several 
states,” differed markedly from section 1 of the Sherman Act, in 
which the definition of commerce was “keyed directly to effects on 
interstate markets.”101 Thus, while Congress intended to “go to the 
                                                                                                             
90 Id. at 273–74. 
91 Id. at 274–75. 
92 See id. at 275. 
93 See id. at 277–78. 
94 See id. at 277. 
95 See id. at 278. 
96 See id. at 283. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194–95 (1974)). 
99 See id. at 283–86. 
100 419 U.S. at 194. 
101 Id. 
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utmost extent of its Constitutional power” in the Sherman Act,102 
Congress intended to exercise only part of its commerce power in 
the Clayton Act.103  Third, the ABMI Court reasoned that when 
Congress re-enacted the Clayton Act in 1950, Congress was well 
aware that “the phrase ‘engaged in commerce’ had long since 
become a term of art, indicating a limited assertion of federal 
jurisdiction.” 104  Fourth, the agencies tasked with enforcing the 
statute understood it to apply only to firms “clearly engaged in the 
flow of interstate commerce.”105 
By using the term “in commerce” instead of “affecting 
commerce,” Congress limited its commerce power to specifically 
regulate only those entities engaged in the flow of commerce.106 
Since the two acquired companies had no clients out of state, rarely 
communicated out of state, and sourced labor and supplies entirely 
in-state,107  they  were  not  engaged  “in  commerce”  within  the 
meaning of the statute.108 
In the second case, United States v. Wright,109 the defendant 
appealed his conviction for interstate transportation of child 
                                                                                                             
102 Id. (quoting United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n., 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944), 
superseded by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as recognized 
in Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)). 
103 Id. at 195. The full quote demonstrates the Court’s conviction that the term “in 
commerce” did not reach as far as the term “affecting commerce”: 
In contrast to [section 1 of the Sherman Act], the distinct ‘in 
commerce’ language of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Act 
provisions with which we are concerned here appears to denote only 
persons or activities within the flow of interstate commerce—the 
practical, economic continuity in the generation of goods and services 
for interstate markets and their transport and distribution to the 
consumer. If this is so, the jurisdictional requirements of these 
provisions cannot be satisfied merely by showing that allegedly 
anticompetitive acquisitions and activities affect commerce. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
104 Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. at 279–80. 
105 See id. at 281–82. 
106 See Gulf Oil, 419 U.S. at 194 (citation omitted). 
107 Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. at 273–74. 
108 See id. at 285–86. 
109 625 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2010), superseded by statute, Omnibus Consolidated 
Appropriations Act 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997), as recognized in 
United States v. Barragan, 871 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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pornography. 110  At the time of the defendant’s conviction, the 
statute made it illegal to “knowingly mail[] or transport[] or ship[] 
in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by 
computer, any child pornography.”111 The parties agreed that no 
proof was presented at trial that the images had crossed state 
lines.112  However,  the  government  sought  an  interpretation  of 
“in . . . commerce” that did “not require actual transportation . . . 
across  state  lines.” 113   The  Ninth  Circuit  rejected  the 
government’s interpretation.114 
The underlying statute had, contrary to the government’s 
reading, a jurisdictional element115 that required the government to 
present evidence that the images moved in interstate commerce.116 
The Ninth Circuit reached this decision for three reasons. First, the 
court found that the plain meaning of the statute “seems to require 
at least some method of interstate travel.”117 Second, authorities in 
other circuits that interpreted similar statutory language from 
different statutes required actual transportation in interstate 
commerce, and cautioned toward construing the provision 
narrowly.118  Both of these reasons centered on the term 
“transport[].” However, the final reason concerned the scope of the 
statute which, at the time of conviction, lacked terms designed to 
invoke the full exercise of congressional power. 119  Indeed, the 
court noted a plethora of instances where Congress sought to 
constrain its power, and leave regulation of intrastate activities to 
the  states.120  Furthermore,  legislative  history  indicates  that 
                                                                                                             
110 See id. at 588. The defendant maintained throughout trial that his roommate, who 
disappeared during the investigation, used the defendant’s computer to store the images. 
See id. at 589. 
111 Id. at 590 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) (2000)). 
112 See id. In fact, the undercover agent who had downloaded the files in question was 
also within the defendant’s state. See id. 
113 Id. at 590–91. 
114 See id. at 600–01. 
115 Id. at 591 (referring to the jurisdictional element as a “jurisdictional hook,” which is 
generally interchangeable with the term “jurisdictional element”). 
116 Id. at 594. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 591–92. 
119 See id. at 592–93 (pointing to terms like “affecting commerce” or “involving 
commerce” focused on by other circuits). 
120 See id. 
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Congress desired to leave intrastate crimes entirely to the state.121 
The judgement was thus reversed.122 
These cases demonstrate that the absence of the “affecting . . . 
commerce” term clearly indicates that Congress exercised less than 
its full authority under the commerce clause. By forbearing part of 
its regulatory authority, Congress can intentionally leave activity 
for the states to regulate, such as it did in Wright.123 
The Nexus Requirement omits “affecting . . . commerce.”124 
Instead, the DTSA states that a product or service must be “used 
in . . . interstate commerce.”125 Congress has been on notice since 
the 1940s that omitting the term “affecting . . . commerce” implies 
the scope of the statute is less than the constitutional maximum.126 
Because omitting this term of art is well understood to have that 
consequence, courts must infer that “Congress means to 
incorporate th[at] established meaning,”127 and therefore, does not 
reach the full extent of Congress’s commerce clause powers. 
Examining the Nexus Requirement in comparison with ABMI 
and Wright confirms this reading. For instance, like ABMI, where 
the re-enacted Clayton Act term “had long since become a term of 
art  indicating  a  limited  assertion  of  federal  jurisdiction,”128 
Congress knew that omitting the term “affecting . . . commerce” 
from the EEA and the DTSA indicated a limited scope of its 
commerce power. Furthermore, Congress changed the statutes at 
issue in ABMI and Wright to expand their reach by adding the term 
                                                                                                             
121 See id. at 592 n.7. 
122 Id. at 601. 
123 Cf. id. at 598 (quoting a Department of Justice writing to suggest Congress strike the 
words “affect interstate commerce” from the initial bill, specifically stating “[i]n our 
opinion [the Department of Justice], the investigation or prosecution of purely local acts 
of child abuse should be left to local authorities with federal involvement confined to 
those instances in which the mails or facilities of interstate commerce are  
actually used . . . .”). 
124 See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61). 
125 Id. 
126 See Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 570 (1943) (indicating that the 
absence of the word “affecting” indicates Congress invoked less than their full authority). 
127 NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981). 
128 United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 280 (1975). 
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“affecting . . . commerce.”129 However, when Congress amended 
the EEA in 2012 and enacted the DTSA in 2016, they omitted the 
term “affecting . . . commerce”,130 yet the new language contains 
the “identical” omission of the term “affecting . . . commerce.”131 
Furthermore, the ABMI Court found it informative to compare 
the  jurisdictional  elements  in  similar  statutes.132  Recall  that  in 
ABMI the Court reasoned that the Sherman Act’s inclusion of the 
term “affecting . . . commerce” indicated that the Clayton Act’s 
omission of the same term reflected Congress’ intent that the 
statute  be  interpreted  more  narrowly.133  The  most  natural 
comparator for the DTSA is the Lanham Act, another federal 
intellectual property statute enacted under the commerce clause.134 
The Lanham Act governs and protects Trademarks “in 
commerce,”135 and is superficially similar to the DTSA because it 
lacks the term “affecting commerce.” The similarity is only 
superficial because the Lanham Act further defines “commerce” as 
“all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress,”136 
effectively expanding its scope to the full extent of congressional 
power, such that even de minimis use in commerce is covered.137 
By contrast, the DTSA does not contain a definition of 
                                                                                                             
129 See Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 122 
Stat. 4001, 4003 (2008) (expanding the jurisdictional element at issue in Wright); 
Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, sec. 6, § 18, 94 Stat. 
1154, 1158 (expanding the scope of the Clayton Act in light of American Building 
Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271). 
130 See Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236, sec. 2, 
§ 1832(a), 126 Stat. 1627 (amending the jurisdictional nexus in light of Aleynikov to its 
current formulation, “used in, or intended for use in” interstate commerce). 
131 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 104-359, at 6, 8–9 (1996); H.R. REP. NO. 104-788,  
at 4, 8–9 (1996). 
132 Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. at 278 (comparing the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1975), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7, 18 (1975)). 
133 See supra notes 97–105 and accompanying text. 
134 Both the DTSA and the Lanham Act must be enacted under the Commerce Clause 
because the Patents and Copyrights Clause of the U.S. Constitution only empowers 
Congress to regulate patents and copyrights. Cf. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S.  
82, 91 (1879). 
135 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012). 
136 Id. § 1127. 
137 See Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986, 992–94 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016). 
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“commerce”  or  “interstate  commerce.”138  Moreover  title  18 
contains a definition of “interstate commerce,” that explicitly 
contemplates movement across state lines (i.e., the flow of 
commerce), rather than any activity that merely  
affects commerce.139 
The Lanham Act provided Congress with a model for enacting 
an intellectual property statute under the commerce clause. But 
Congress did not follow that model in a significant respect: 
Congress decided to omit the term “affecting . . . commerce,” and 
declined to define interstate commerce in either the EEA or the 
DTSA.140 Just as the difference between the scope of the Sherman 
Act and Clayton Act indicated that Congress exercised only a 
portion of its commerce power under the Clayton Act, so too does 
the difference between the Lanham Act and the DTSA demonstrate 
Congress’s intent to forbear part of its commerce power. 
C. Limiting Terms and Other Indicia of a Narrow Nexus 
The scope of a statute is determined by the extent to which 
Congress exercised its commerce power—it is exercised in full 
where the term “affecting . . . commerce” is employed or, possibly, 
a functionally equivalent term.141 In the absence of such language, 
as will be seen, the scope of the statute is determined through 
reference to other indicia of congressional intent. The Supreme 
Court, as explained below, has indicated that other statutory 
language may define the scope of a statute. 
This is the case with ABMI and Wright, discussed above. 
There, the absence of the term “affecting . . . commerce” was 
instructive, but not wholly dispositive of the question of the scope 
of  the  statute.142  Other  indicia  of  a  limited  exercise  of 
congressional authority was instructive, such as in ABMI where the 
Court compared the jurisdictional element of the Clayton Act to 
                                                                                                             
138 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) (expanding the 
definition section of the EEA, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012)). 
139 See 18 U.S.C. § 10; McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 648–55 (1982) 
(interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 10). 
140 See supra text accompanying notes 138–39. 
141 See supra Section II.B. 
142 See supra Section II.B. 
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another statute regulating competition, namely, the Sherman 
Act.143 In Wright, the Ninth Circuit noted the slow and deliberate 
expansion of congressional power into the realm of state 
regulation, which counseled in favor of narrowly interpreting the 
statutory language.144 
In other cases, the Court has relied on limiting terms within the 
jurisdictional element itself to infer a limited exercise of 
congressional power. Specifically, the term “used in” has been 
considered to limit the exercise of congressional authority under 
the commerce clause, as the Supreme Court held in Jones v. United 
States.145 The Court reached this decision even though the phrase 
appeared in conjunction with the term “affecting commerce.”146 At 
issue  in  Jones  was  the  federal  statute  outlawing  arson.147  In 
pertinent part, the statute criminalizes “damag[ing] . . . by means 
of fire . . . any building . . . used in interstate or foreign commerce 
or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”148 The 
defendant had been convicted of arson after allegedly throwing a 
Molotov cocktail into his cousin’s house. 149  The question was 
whether  Congress  had  criminalized  this  conduct. 150   The 
government argued for an expansive definition of “used in”: the 
house was “used . . . in an activity affecting interstate commerce” 
because the owner had a mortgage (the home was “used” to secure 
a loan), the owner obtained insurance from an out-of-state firm, 
and the gas for the home came from out of state.151 
But the Court rejected the government’s expansive view.152 
Instead, the qualifying words “used in” indicated a constrained 
exercise of the commerce power.153 This was so even though the 
statute includes the term “affecting . . . commerce”—which 
                                                                                                             
143 See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
145 See 529 U.S. 848, 850–51 (2000). 
146 Id. at 855–56. 
147 See id. at 852. 
148 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2012) 
149 See Jones, 529 U.S. at 851. 
150 See id. at 852. 
151 Id. at 855. 
152 See id. at 859. 
153 See id. at 854. 
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normally “signal[s] Congress’ intent to invoke its full authority 
under the Commerce Clause.”154 The phrase, “used in,” the Court 
held, limits the buildings regulated by the statute to those in “active 
employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive, 
passing, or past connection to commerce.”155 Because the house in 
question was not actively used for a commercial purpose, it fell 
outside the statute’s scope.156 
The Court’s interpretation of the statute was heavily influenced 
by the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.157 A more expansive 
definition of the term “used in” would have implicated “grave and 
doubtful constitutional questions,” and the Court generally 
construes statutes to avoid such questions.158 Thus, absent such 
constitutional concerns, the Court may have been willing to give 
the term “used in . . . an activity affecting commerce” a more 
expansive definition. Be that as it may, Jones indicates that the 
presence of statutory terms such as “used in” operates to restrict 
the scope of the underlying statute. 
There are two indicia that the Nexus Requirement is narrow. 
The first is the term “used in,” and the second is the title-wide 
definition of interstate commerce. 
First, the Nexus Requirement incorporates the term “used in” 
to modify the requisite connection between the product or service 
and interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has held that the 
term “used in,” when incorporated into a jurisdictional hook, 
requires actual use in interstate commerce,159 or in other words, the 
“used in” term signals that the products or services must be in the 
flow of interstate commerce.160 Indeed, both Second Circuit panels 
                                                                                                             
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 855. 
156 See id. at 859. 
157 See id. at 857–58. 
158 Id. at 857 (citing United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co.,  
213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)). 
159 See, e.g., id. at 855. 
160 See United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 276 (1975) (“The 
distinct ‘in commerce’ language . . . ‘appears to denote only persons or activities within 
the flow of interstate commerce—the practical, economic continuity in the generation of 
goods and services for interstate markets and their transport and distribution to the 
consumer.’” (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974))). 
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interpreted the term “used in” in the context of the EEA, finding 
that it required actual flow of the product—or intended flow of the 
product—across state lines.161 
Second, title 18 includes a narrow definition of the term 
“interstate commerce,” which “includes commerce between one 
State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and 
another State, Territory, Possession, or the District of 
Columbia.”162 On its face, this provision contemplates movement 
from one state across political borders to another state. Courts have 
recognized that this definition requires “passing to and fro” across 
political borders in the flow of interstate commerce.163 This is in 
marked contrast to blanket definitions in other statutes, which 
extend well beyond the flow of commerce across borders to reach 
entirely intrastate activities.164 Indeed, even within title 18, when 
Congress intends to provide for a more expansive exercise of its 
commerce power, it specifically includes the word “affecting” in 
the statute.165 
                                                                                                             
161 See United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235, 245 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that 
products must be introduced into the “stream” of commerce); United States v. Aleynikov, 
676 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a trade secret that affects commerce but was 
not in the stream of commerce did not support prosecution under the EEA). 
162 See 18 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
163 Londos v. United States, 240 F.2d 1, 6 (5th Cir. 1957); see, e.g., McElroy v. United 
States, 455 U.S. 642, 648–56 (1982) (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 10 contemplates items 
crossing state lines, but is “not limited to unlawful activities that occur while crossing 
state borders,” and therefore reaches activities “at any and all times during the course of 
its movement in interstate commerce”); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114  
(9th Cir. 2006). 
164 See, e.g., Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“The word ‘commerce’ . . . [is] all 
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”); 21 U.S.C. § 1033(c) (2012) 
(“The term ‘commerce’ means interstate, foreign, or intrastate commerce . . . .”); see also 
29 U.S.C. § 630(h) (2012) (supplementing the definition of commerce with a definition 
of “industry affecting commerce” as “any activity, business, or industry in commerce or 
in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of 
commerce”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (2012) (same). 
165 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012) (making it illegal for a felon to “transport in 
interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition” (emphasis added)); id. § 24 (defining “health care benefit program” as “any 
public or private plan or contract, affecting commerce, under which any medical 
benefit . . . is provided to any individual” (emphasis added)); id. § 175b(a)(1) (“No 
restricted person shall ship or transport in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or 
possess in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, any biological agent or toxin . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
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D. Functional Equivalency 
The Supreme Court has, in one instance, indicated that another 
statutory term may serve as the functional equivalent of 
“affecting . . . commerce.” Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”) allows for the enforceability of mandatory arbitration 
terms contained in “a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce.”166  In  Allied-Bruce  Terminix  Companies,  Inc.  v. 
Dobson,167  the  Supreme  Court  considered  whether  a  contract 
contemplating primarily local activities was included in this 
definition, despite the absence of the term “affecting 
commerce.”168 The Supreme Court held that the statute exercised 
“Congress’ commerce power to the full” extent, and therefore 
reached local contracts.169 The Court was persuaded that the phrase 
“involving commerce” was the “functional equivalent” of the term 
“affecting commerce.”170 The Court cited the similarity between 
the dictionary definitions of “involve” and “affect,”171 as well as 
congressional intent to exercise its full power,172 and the frustration 
of the statute’s purpose without a broad interpretation of the term 
“involving commerce.”173 
As a preliminary matter, the functional equivalency doctrine 
has not been applied to interstate commerce outside of the FAA. 
As both parties in Allied-Bruce admitted, such a term is unique in 
the U.S. Code.174 Although Allied-Bruce has not been overruled,175 
its application of the functional equivalency doctrine may be 
limited to the term “involving commerce.” Furthermore, Allied-
Bruce’s interpretive methodology has been largely eclipsed in the 
                                                                                                             
166 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
167 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
168 See id. at 269–70. 
169 Id. at 277. 
170 Id. at 273–74, 277. 
171 See id. at 274. 
172 See id. at 279. 
173 See id. at 275. 
174 See id. at 273. 
175 Although the Court decided Allied-Bruce before Lopez and Morrison, the Court has 
held that Lopez does not affect the functional equivalency doctrine. See Citizens Bank 
v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 58 (2003). 
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two decades since it was decided.176 Thus, arguments to apply the 
functional equivalency doctrine beyond the FAA may no longer 
rest on solid foundations. 
Even if the functional equivalency doctrine applies outside the 
context of the FAA, it does not apply to the DTSA. The Nexus 
Requirement has no term that can be construed as functionally 
equivalent to “affecting . . . commerce.”177 The Qualifying Phrase, 
as a whole, contains no functionally equivalent term either.178 The 
term “related to”—in fact, the entire Relationship Requirement—
cannot serve as functionally equivalent because it performs a 
separate function within the jurisdictional element by defining the 
proximate connection between the product or service and the trade 
secret.179 In the DTSA, “related to” modifies “product or service,” 
not  “commerce”;180  whereas  in  Allied-Bruce,  the  functionally 
equivalent  term  directly  modified  “commerce.”181  Interpreting 
“related to” as functionally equivalent stretches the Qualifying 
Phrase past its grammatical breaking point. Word choice and word 
placement matter in statutory interpretation. There is a meaningful 
difference between “dogs prohibited” (a narrow rule), and 
“dangerous animals prohibited” (a broader standard), which is 
directly related to the words used in the legislation.182 Only where 
                                                                                                             
176 Justice Breyer’s first source of authority when interpreting the FAA in Allied-Bruce 
was the “basic purpose” of the law. See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 270. The 
Court’s emerging consensus around text-centered purposivism may have deeply 
undermined Breyer’s interpretive methodology in Allied-Bruce Terminix. See supra notes 
63–67 and accompanying text. 
177 See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61). 
178 See id. 
179 See infra Part III. 
180 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1). 
181 See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 274. Compare DTSA § 1836(b)(1) 
(“[R]elated to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign 
commerce.”), with 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“[A] contract evidencing a transaction  
involving commerce.”). 
182 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 89–90 (1984); see also Manning, New Purposivism, supra 
note 63, at 116: 
On this account [the ‘new purpovisim’ of the Court], even if one 
believes that law is inescapably purposive and that interpreters should 
interpret a statute to fulfill its purpose, an interpreter must take 
seriously the signals that Congress sends through the level of 
generality reflected in its choice of words. 
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the term relates to the nexus between the trade secret, product or 
service, and interstate commerce, can the term serve as the 
functional equivalent of “affecting.” In other words, if the term 
serves a separate function within the statute, it cannot be 
functionally equivalent to “affecting.” Thus, there is no  
functional equivalent. 
E. Interpreting the Nexus Requirement 
As the prior sections demonstrate, the terms of the Nexus 
Requirement should be narrowly construed to require the identified 
product or service to actually flow in interstate commerce, or be 
intended to actually flow in interstate commerce. However, 
because it is well-established that Congress can regulate such 
products or services at any point along the stream of commerce,183 
the Nexus Requirement at its broadest may not be much narrower 
than the full exercise of Congress’s commerce power.184 But, it 
removes from the scope of the DTSA purely intrastate products or 
services, as well as products or services that affect interstate 
commerce only. 
III. NARROWNESS OF THE RELATIONSHIP REQUIREMENT 
The term “related to a product or service” is entirely unique in 
the U.S. Code.185 Thus, unlike the Nexus Requirement, the terms 
of the Relationship Requirement have accumulated no plain 
meaning. This Part argues that the Relationship Requirement 
should be construed narrowly. As discussed below, statutory 
context and background principles of the law suggest that the 
Relationship Requirement insists on a close, discernable, and direct 
relationship—rather than a passing, possible, or indirect 
relationship—between the trade secret and the product or service. 
                                                                                                             
183 See McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 648–56 (1982). 
184 See, e.g., Diane McGimsey, Comment, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After 
Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional Element Loophole, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1704–06 (2002). 
185 The phrase only appears in the EEA, 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012), and  
DTSA § 1836(b)(1). 
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To discern the meaning of the Relationship Requirement, this 
Part proceeds in five sections. The first, Section III.A, discusses 
background principles of law, starting with the (rather unhelpful) 
dictionary definition of “related.” Not only is it ambiguous, but the 
definition—read at its broadest—contradicts other terms in the 
statute. The second, Section III.B, discusses how the statutory 
context of the Relationship Requirement independently supports a 
narrow reading of the term “related to.” A narrow reading is 
suggested by the economic espionage provision of the EEA and the 
anti-preemption provision of the DTSA. Section III.C discusses 
how the parallel term “related to” in the EEA has—with one 
notable exception—been narrowly interpreted to require a close 
relationship between the trade secret and product or service. The 
fourth, Section III.D, proposes a test to determine whether a trade 
secret is sufficiently “related to” a product or service. Finally, 
Section III.E concludes by exploring and rejecting an alternative, 
broader, interpretation of the Relationship Requirement. 
A. Background Principles Require a Narrow Relationship 
Requirement 
This Section discusses two background principles of statutory 
interpretation. The first is the principle that the plain meaning of an 
unambiguous term governs. The dictionary definition of “related 
to” does not clarify the meaning of the term. Instead, both 
definitions raise the same question: how closely must the trade 
secret be related to or connected to the product or service? The 
second background principle applied by this Section is that courts 
should not construe provisions to read terms out of a statute. 
Guided by this insight, this Section returns to the plain meaning of 
the term, which—as revealed by its context—is  
necessarily narrow. 
The starting-point for any interpretation of statutory terms is 
the text itself. In King v. Burwell, the Court interpreted the plain 
meaning of the term “established by the State” in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly referred to as the 
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“ACA”  or  “Obamacare”).186  The  Court  discussed  how  to 
determine plain meaning: 
If the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it 
according to its terms. But oftentimes the 
‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or 
phrases may only become evident when placed in 
context.’ So when deciding whether the language is 
plain, we must read the words ‘in their context and 
with a view to their place in the overall statutory 
scheme.’ Our duty, after all, is to ‘construe statutes, 
not isolated provisions.’187 
The conundrum identified by the Court in King and in the quote 
above, is that words may have one meaning when read in isolation, 
but have another meaning when they are read in their  
proper context. 
In isolation, the term “related to” can be quite broad. The 
American Heritage Dictionary defines “related” as “[c]onnected; 
associated.” 188  The term—and its equivalents “connected” and 
“associated”—at their maximal breadth encompass any relation, 
connection, or association. But, the Supreme Court has 
admonished courts that “construing statutory language is not 
merely an exercise in ascertaining ‘the outer limits of [a word’s] 
definitional possibilities.’”189 Instead, “[i]interpretation of a word 
or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text,” which 
may “require a narrower reading” than the “definition of words  
in isolation.”190 
                                                                                                             
186 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (examining the validity of 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2010), 
as it pertains to section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code). 
187 Id. (first quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010); 
then quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000); 
and then quoting Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. 
Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 290 (2010)). 
188 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1043 (2d College ed. 1982); see also Related, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/related [https://perma
.cc/VG39-7V49] (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (“[C]onnected by reason of an established or 
discoverable relation.”). 
189 See FCC v. AT&T, Inc. 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1184 (2011) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)). 
190 Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486. 
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When read in its statutory context, the Relationship 
Requirement is narrow. The Qualifying Phrase itself indicates that 
the civil remedy is available only for certain trade secrets: i.e., “if 
the  trade  secret  is  related  to  a  product  or  service.”191  The 
Qualifying Phrase itself exists to identify which trade secrets have 
protection under the DTSA. Allowing a suit if the trade secret has 
any relation to a product or service would allow for 
misappropriation suits over all trade secrets. Since the Qualifying 
Phrase clearly narrows the scope of actionable misappropriation, a 
broad reading of the term “related to” would read the Qualifying 
Phrase out of the statute.192 If Congress had wanted that result, it 
should have placed a period where the Qualifying phrase belongs, 
like so: “An owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may 
bring a civil action under this subsection[.]”193 There is a strong 
background presumption in statutory interpretation that courts 
should not construe provisions to read terms out of the statute.194 
Applying that presumption undermines a broad reading of the term 
“related to.” 
Instead, the term “product or service” anchors the trade secret 
at issue to the statute. The weaker the relationship, the weaker the 
anchor. A narrow interpretation of the term avoids reading the 
Qualifying Phrase out of the statute, and ensures that the trade 
secret is sufficiently connected to the product or service to warrant 
federal protection. In that way, the Qualifying Phrase serves to 
identify which trade secrets support an action for misappropriation. 
As the next section demonstrates, plenty of evidence in the broader 
statutory context supports this conclusion. 
                                                                                                             
191 DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) 
(emphasis added). 
192 See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1949 (2016) 
(“[O]ur constitutional structure does not permit this Court to ‘rewrite the statute that 
Congress has enacted.’” (quoting Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005))); 
United States v. Taylor, 686 F.3d 182, 193 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting “the general principle 
that we should avoid interpretations that effectively read words out of a statute”). 
193 DTSA § 1836(b)(1). 
194 See supra note 192. 
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B. Intrinsic Statutory Context Suggests a Narrow Relationship 
Requirement 
The conclusion reached in the prior section—that the 
Relationship Requirement must be read narrowly—is supported by 
federal trade secret provisions outside the Qualifying Phrase. This 
Section discusses two such provisions: the economic espionage 
provision of the EEA, and the anti-preemption provision of  
the DTSA. 
First, a narrow construction of the Relationship Requirement is 
suggested by comparing the Relationship Requirement to the 
economic espionage provision of the EEA, one of two federal trade 
secret crimes (the other is criminal corporate espionage). The 
EEA’s economic espionage provision makes it a crime to “steal[], 
or without authorization appropriate[], take[], carr[y] away, or 
conceal[], or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtain[] a trade 
secret.”195 Notably, this provision has no Qualifying Phrase; the 
only other requirements are an intent to benefit a foreign 
government and knowledge that the trade secret is a trade secret.196 
Thus, any trade secret—without qualification—supports 
prosecution under the economic espionage provision. On the other 
hand, the Qualifying Phrase appears in both the corporate 
espionage provision of the EEA (the other criminal provision)197 
and the DTSA.198 This clearly implies that the DTSA’s Qualifying 
Phrase narrows which trade secrets support an action for 
misappropriation: under the economic espionage provision of the 
EEA, any trade secrets support prosecution; under the DTSA, only 
sufficiently related trade secrets support civil action. 
Second, a narrow construction of the Relationship Requirement 
is necessary to make sense of the DTSA’s anti-preemption 
provision, which makes clear that the federal act does not preempt 
state  remedies  for  trade  secret  misappropriation.199  The  anti-
                                                                                                             
195 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(1) (2012). 
196 Id. § 1831(a) (“Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense shall benefit any 
foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly . . . .”). 
197 See id. § 1832(a) (showing that, other than the Qualifying Phrase, section 1832 is 
identical to section 1831). 
198 DTSA § 1836(b)(1) (amending EEA § 1836(b)). 
199 Id. § 1838. 
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preemption provision creates a two-tiered system of state and 
federal trade secret protection. However, nearly all of the state 
trade secret statutes and the DTSA are based on the UTSA.200 
Given that differences among states remain dispositive,201 there is 
a great likelihood that federal trade secret law will create a 
preemption issue if both the state and federal laws cover identical 
subject matter.202 
An example will help explain. The DTSA indicates that 
misappropriation occurs, inter alia, if the disclosure is made in 
violation of a “duty to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret.”203 
In state trade secret cases, this duty generally arises under 
contract.204 Contractual non-disclosure agreements are likely to be 
interpreted under state law.205 But state laws vary considerably on 
the question of whether a contract defines the full extent of the 
                                                                                                             
200 S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 2016, S. REP. NO.  
114-220, at 2. 
201 Id. 
202 The DTSA presents a particularly pernicious preemption issue because, while it 
includes an express anti-preemption section (also called a “savings clause”), federal law 
may end up directly conflicting with state law on a host of issues. This Article does not 
deal directly with the preemption issue, but suggests that a narrow jurisdictional element 
minimizes this problem. See, e.g., Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9 
(2003) (finding that complete preemption only occurs where a federal statute provides the 
“exclusive” cause of action); Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 702–03 (4th 
Cir. 2015) (finding that where federal law is not the exclusive remedy, preemption is not 
complete); DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1030–31 
(E.D. Wis. 2008) (finding congressional intent in the Fair Labor Standards Act context, 
expressed through savings clause, to not preempt state law limits preemption to  
direct conflict). 
203 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(5)(B)(ii)(II) (amending EEA § 1839); see also id. 
§ 1839(5)(B)(ii)(III) (“[D]erived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person 
seeking relief to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret . . . .”); id. § 1839(6)(A) (stating 
the term “improper means” includes “breach of a duty to maintain secrecy”). 
204 See, e.g., ELIZABETH ROWE & SHARON SANDEEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE 
SECRET LAW 279 (2d ed. 2017) (indicating that the duty of confidentiality arises from two 
general sources: contract and common law). 
205 This Article assumes, for argument, that contractual terms at issue in trade secret 
cases will be interpreted under state law. This balance has been previously struck in 
patent law concerning assignments that interpret their validity under state law and the 
ability to assign patents under the Patent Act. See Abbot Point of Care, Inc. v. Epocal, 
Inc., 666 F.3d 1299, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“This court also reviews contract 
interpretations without deference . . . . State law governs contract interpretation.”); 
Beghin-Say Int’l Inc. v. Ole-Bendt Rasmussen, 733 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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duty of confidentiality. 206  Thus, federal courts interpreting the 
issue may end up preempting state fiduciary or contract law 
regarding the duty of confidentiality.207 
An expansive definition of the Relationship Requirement 
would put federal courts into the business of interpreting and 
implying fiduciary duties owed by directors or executives as to 
general business secrets. There is no reason to believe that a duty 
of confidentiality under the DTSA is necessarily tied to state law. 
Thus, the preemption implications from an expansive Relationship 
Requirement  are  serious.208  This  Article  argues  that  general 
business secrets are beyond the scope of the DTSA because they 
are  not  sufficiently  related  to  products  or  services.209  Such 
information is generally governed by a combination of state 
fiduciary law and state trade secret law, and a narrow interpretation 
avoids preempting the state-law balance between the two. 
Therefore, the anti-preemption provision makes most sense if 
the system of trade secret protection is actually two-tiered (i.e., if 
some trade secrets are excluded from the federal act). Exclusion of 
general business information from the federal act would minimize 
preemption possibilities and relegate litigation over that issue to 
the state courts. Continuing to recognize the federalism values 
embedded into the DTSA, the state courts are better able to balance 
the law governing their corporations and general business 
information—the confidentiality of which is tied closely to state 
contract, tort, employment, and fiduciary law. Thus, the anti-
preemption provision clearly suggests a narrow  
Relationship Requirement. 
Statutory context points towards a narrow Relationship 
Requirement. Simply identifying a trade secret as somehow 
connected or associated with a product or service is insufficient. 
                                                                                                             
206 Compare Den-Tal-Ez, Inc. v. Siemens Capital Corp., 566 A.2d 1214, 1224–25 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1989) (finding Pennsylvania fiduciary law provides independent duty of 
confidentiality in addition to contractual provisions), with Morris Silverman Mgmt. Co. 
v. W. Union Fin. Servs., 284 F. Supp. 2d 964, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (dismissing a trade 
secret suit because, under Illinois law, the contract defines the extent of the duty of 
confidentiality and the defendant’s conduct did not breach the contract). 
207 See, e.g., Levine & Sandeen, supra note 53, at 244; Seaman, supra note 33, at 364. 
208 See Seaman, supra note 33, at 359–62. 
209 See generally infra Sections III.D, IV.B. 
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The Relationship Requirement insists on a strong anchor tying the 
trade secret to the product or service. But how close must the 
relationship be? The next section explores how the EEA’s 
Relationship Requirement has been interpreted. 
C. Interpretation of the Term “Related to” in Prior EEA 
Litigation Suggests a Narrow Interpretation 
As the previous two sections discussed, the term “related to” 
must be read narrowly. This, in general, comports with how courts 
have construed a related phrase in the criminal theft provision of 
the EEA. This Section discusses interpretation by federal district 
and circuit courts of the term “related to.” 210 
1. U.S. District Courts Generally Interpret “Related to” 
Narrowly 
The Author surveyed every district court case discussing the 
term “related to” in the EEA. The survey reveals that most 
prosecuted trade secrets dealt directly with the manufacture, 
development, or design of a product.211 In these cases, there was no 
impetus to examine whether the trade secret was sufficiently 
related to the product or service.212 However, in United States v. 
Hsu, a defendant challenged the term “related to” as 
unconstitutionally vague. 213  The district court ruled against the 
defendant, finding that, as applied, there was no vagueness because 
the trade secret at issue involved a manufacturing process (i.e., was 
intimately associated with the product).214 
                                                                                                             
210 The context of “related to” has changed multiple times over the history of the EEA. 
The phrase is currently identical to the DTSA’s term. See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1832(a) 
(West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) (amending EEA, 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) 
(2012)). But, the similarities over time are greater than the differences, and this Article 
addresses the impact of changes in the language in Section III.E. 
211 See, e.g., United States v. Sing, No. CR 14-212(A)-CAS, 2016 WL 54906, at *6 n.6 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2016) (concerning prosecution for theft of schematics and test 
procedures related to aircraft); United States v. Yihao Pu, 15 F. Supp. 3d 846, 852–53 
(N.D. Ill. 2014) (concerning prosecution for stealing source code that indicated which 
stocks to sell or buy); United States v. Zhang, No. CR–05–00812 RMW, 2012 WL 
1932843, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2012) (concerning prosecution for technical and 
engineering information concerning product design choices). 
212 See generally cases appearing in note 211. 
213 See United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627–28 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
214 Id. at 627–28. 
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The void-for-vagueness argument raises a fairness issue at the 
heart of interpreting the term “related to.” Read too broadly, the 
term encompasses all valuable secret information, regardless of its 
connection to a product or service. Yet the statute seems to 
contemplate at least some connection between a product or service 
and the information. Absent a direct connection between the 
product or service and the information appropriated, the criminal 
provision of the EEA becomes dangerously vague. This argument 
weighs heavily toward defining “related to” narrowly as intimately 
connected to, rather than conceivably connected to, the product or 
service. Thus, under the EEA, the term “related to” generally 
requires a direct relationship—such as manufacturing or design—
between the product or service and the trade secret.215 
2. The Second Circuit’s Intra-Circuit Split 
This Subsection discusses two cases from the Second Circuit 
that wrestled with the difficulty of defining the term “related to.” 
The Second Circuit is the only federal circuit court to address the 
interpretation of the term “related to” in the EEA. Both cases deal 
with prosecution under the criminal theft provision of the EEA, 
whose Relationship Requirement at the time read: “related to or 
included  in  a  product.”216  The  core  of  the  court’s  difficulty 
concerns the ambiguity of the term “related to.” 
United States v. Aleynikov217 and United States v. Agrawal218 
provide an interesting viewpoint on the meaning of the term 
“related to.” Both cases involve the same type of trade secret, yet 
are decided in opposite ways by different panels less than a  
year apart. 
Sergey Aleynikov worked at Goldman Sachs as a computer 
programmer developing source code for the company’s high-
                                                                                                             
215 The narrowness of the EEA is reflected in the judicial treatment of the foreign 
espionage provision as well. See Robin L. Kuntz, Note, How Not to Catch a Thief: Why 
the Economic Espionage Act Fails to Protect American Trade Secrets, 28 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 901, 914–22 (2013) (canvassing the narrowness of EEA § 1831 based on 
terms not incorporated into the DTSA). 
216 See Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488, 3489 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1832(a)). 
217 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012). 
218 726 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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frequency trading system.219 Goldman Sachs heavily guarded the 
system and never licensed it.220 In 2009, Aleynikov left Goldman 
Sachs to join a Chicago-based startup looking to develop its own 
high-frequency  trading  system.221  On  his  last  day  at  work, 
Aleynikov encrypted and uploaded over half a million lines of 
code to a German-based server.222 Aleynikov attended a meeting 
with the startup in Illinois, to which he brought portions of the 
proprietary code, and was arrested when he returned to New 
York.223  A  jury  convicted  him  of  violating  the  EEA,  and  he 
appealed that count on the theory that the source code was not 
“related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed 
in interstate or foreign commerce.”224 
The Second Circuit reversed Aleynikov’s conviction.225 They 
construed the EEA’s then-existing Nexus Requirement narrowly 
and held that the statute did not reach Goldman Sachs’ trade 
secret.226 Goldman Sachs had no intention of selling the system or 
licensing it to anyone: “Because the [high-frequency trading] 
system was not designed to enter or pass in commerce, or to make 
something that does, Aleynikov’s theft of source code relating to 
that system was not an offense under the EEA.”227 While the panel 
decided the case on the Nexus Requirement (i.e., that the high-
frequency trading platform did not flow in interstate commerce), it 
also implicitly construed the term “related to” narrowly by 
insisting that the trade secret “make something that [flows in 
interstate commerce].”228 
In Agrawal, the Second Circuit took a closer look at the 
Relationship Requirement. Agrawal dealt with the same type of 
trade secret (source code enabling high frequency trading),229 but 
                                                                                                             
219 Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 73. 
220 Id. at 74. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 73. 
225 See id. at 82. 
226 See id. at 80, 82. 
227 Id. at 82. 
228 See id.; see also Agrawal, 726 F.3d at 267 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (insisting that this, 
indeed, is Aleynikov’s interpretation of “related to”). 
229 See Agrawal, 726 F.3d at 237–38. 
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found that the trade secret could be properly prosecuted.230 First, 
the prosecutor asserted that stocks constituted the “product,” not 
the source code itself. 231  Stocks are products in the flow of 
interstate commerce, and thus provided the requisite nexus to 
interstate commerce. (One seriously wonders how this 
distinguishes the case from Aleynikov, which also involved a high-
frequency trading system and the sale of stocks.)232 Finding the 
then-existing Nexus Requirement satisfied, the court followed the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term “related to” in other 
statutes, 233   and construed its meaning “broad[ly].” 234  Despite 
recognizing that the Supreme Court has previously cautioned that 
“the term [‘related to’] must be read in context,” 235  the panel 
engaged in an extraordinarily limited contextual analysis, 
remarking only that the twin term “included in” encouraged a 
broad definition.236 
Judge Rosemary S. Pooler (who also sat on the Aleynikov 
panel) vigorously dissented. Judge Pooler accused the panel of 
“mischaracteriz[ing]” the facts “while simultaneous stretching 
Aleynikov and disregarding the principle of stare decisis.”237 She 
pointed to numerous instances indicating that the term “related to” 
should be construed narrowly: Aleynikov interpreted the term 
narrowly as relating to the “making” of a product; 238  “general 
                                                                                                             
230 See id. at 247. 
231 See id. at 246. 
232 The court’s distinction is weak: 
While Agrawal’s indictment did not state this theory in so many 
words, it did allege that SocGen engaged in ‘high-frequency trading 
[“HFT”] in securities’ on national markets ‘such as the New York 
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ Stock Market.’ This effectively 
identified securities as products traded in interstate commerce. 
See id. (citation omitted).  
233 See id. at 247–48. 
234 Id. at 247 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)). 
235 Id. 
236 See id. 
237 Id. at 269 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
238 Judge Pooler stated: 
In Aleynikov, we gave one hint as to what might constitute ‘related 
to’ when we held that ‘because the HFT system was not designed to 
enter or pass in commerce, or to make something that 
does, Aleynikov’s theft of source code relating to that system was not 
an offense under the EEA.’ Under this interpretation, the phrase 
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principles of statutory construction obligat[e] us to read Congress’s 
statutes narrowly;”239 and both the House and Senate Reports to 
the EEA provided examples of trade secrets closely related to the 
manufacturing and design of products.240 
Judge Pooler’s dissent in Agrawal is much more convincing on 
the question of interpreting the term “related to.” For example, her 
insistence that “related to” requires a close relationship, such as 
“making” a product, finds clear parallel in the district court cases 
examining the phrase.241 At the same time, the majority opinion 
ignored the Supreme Court’s warnings to avoid simply seeking the 
maximum extent of a term’s meaning in isolation.242 Furthermore, 
the majority’s construction runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s 
instruction  to  interpret  terms  in  context.243  Their  conclusory 
statement that “related to” has a maximal reach is insupportable in 
light of the textual and contextual evidence identified above. 
Congress has amended the language of the EEA’s Nexus 
Provision to its current form.244 Significantly, Congress kept the 
                                                                                                             
‘related to’ is most naturally read to deal with things like a piece of 
specialized machinery, which itself is not intended to enter the stream 
of commerce, but which makes the product that does so. 
Id. at 267 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
239 Id. at 268 (citing FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1184 (2011)). 
240 Such examples include: 
Finally, the majority’s interpretation also offends the legislative 
history of the statute which narrowly construes ‘related to.’ In both 
the House and Senate Reports on the EEA, examples of trade secrets 
that ‘relate to’ products included production processes, bid estimates, 
production schedules, manufacturing specifications or fermentation 
processes. All of these listed trade secrets bear a much closer 
relationship to a product than the relationship between the securities 
and the code asserted by the majority. In fact, all of these 
relationships adhere to the description of ‘related to’ we gave in 
Aleynikov that the trade secret ‘makes something that results in  
a product.’ 
Id. at 268 (citing S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 6, 8–9; H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 4, 8–9) 
(quoting United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original)). 
241 See supra Section III.C.1. 
242 See supra Section III.A. 
243 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015); see also supra Section III.A. 
244 See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) 
(amending EEA, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012)). 
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term “related to” and added the term “service.” 245  Thus, the 
precedential value of Aleynikov and Agrawal is slim. However, 
Pooler’s dissent clearly marshals more convincing evidence that 
the term “related to” is narrow. 
D. Defining “Related to”: Discerning the Direction of Trade 
Secret Value 
This Article proposes measuring the sufficiency of the 
relationship through the direction of the trade secret’s value. The 
value of a trade secret (as a matter of definition) is derived from its 
secrecy, and can serve as a proxy for the strength of the anchor 
connecting the trade secret to the product or service.246  Courts 
generally measure the value of the trade secret in terms of its 
hypothetical value in the eyes of the competitor.247 The DTSA 
defines a trade secret as something known to one person or 
company  (e.g.,  a  process,  information,  etc.),248  which  is  not 
known—and actively concealed from—the public,249  and which 
“derives independent economic value” from not being known.250 It 
is the strength of this independent economic value that anchors the 
trade secret to the product or service. 
This Section proposes the following test to determine whether 
a trade secret is sufficiently related to a product or service under 
the Relationship Requirement: whether, if the trade secret becomes 
known to a competitor, the value of the plaintiff’s product or 
service in the eyes of the competitor declines.251 If so, the value of 
                                                                                                             
245 See id. 
246 See id. § 1839(3) (amending EEA § 1839(3)); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 
§ 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1979) (amended 1985). 
247 See, e.g., MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 396, 424 (E.D. 
Va. 2004). 
248 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3). 
249 See id. § 1839(3)(B). 
250 Id. 
251 Importantly, this test is divorced from the market price of the product or service. 
Exposure of a trade secret may not affect the market price of a product or service for a 
host of reasons, including first-mover advantages, switching costs, brand, consumer 
knowledge, transaction costs, supply-line logistics, etc. The focus is on whether the 
competitor values the product or service less because it indicates that the secret is integral 
to the product or service. If a competitor knows your secret ingredient, then the value of 
your product is lessened. Theoretically, as the competitor replicates the secret the market 
prices would converge, but the test does not require an impact on the market price. 
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the trade secret is directed at the product or service, and therefore, 
is sufficiently related to the product or service. If not, then the 
value of the trade secret is not directed at, and is insufficiently 
related to, the product or service. As Part IV explores, this test 
operates to relegate litigation over general business information to 
state courts while opening federal courts to technical trade secrets. 
Two illustrations will help illuminate this test. These 
illustrations are derived from the case Peggy Lawton Kitchens, Inc. 
v. Hogan,252 which concerns a recipe for cookies. The recipe calls 
for adding a “secret ingredient”—namely, walnut dust—to 
cookies, which rocketed Peggy Lawton Kitchens to great 
success.253  The  illustration  imagines  two  situations.  The  first 
situation is one in which the misappropriated trade secret is the 
recipe itself; the second situation imagines the misappropriated 
trade secret is a strategic plan (including, inter alia, the profit 
margins on the cookies and supplier contract information). 
In the first situation, where the trade secret is the recipe, the 
value of the trade secret is directed at the product (cookies). The 
value of the secret consists of a je-ne-sais-quoi taste that is not 
easily reverse-engineered, which differentiates the product from 
competitors’ products. If the competitors know the secret, they can 
eliminate the differentiation by including the walnut dust in their 
own recipes. The value of the original cookies is therefore reduced 
in the eyes of the competitors, who now know the difference. 
In the second situation, where the trade secret is the strategic 
plan, the value of the trade secret is not directed at the product, but 
rather the strategic value of knowing a competitor’s profit margins 
and suppliers. Knowledge of the secret might enable a competitor 
to cut into a profit margin or steal a supplier, but it would not 
affect the value of the cookie to the competitor. The competitor 
must languish in ignorance of the secret ingredient. The strategic 
plan doesn’t allow the competitor to produce a more competitive 
cookie, because the differentiator is still secret. 
The recipe would be actionable under the DTSA because it is 
related to the product. The strategic plan would only be actionable 
                                                                                                             
252 466 N.E.2d 138 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984). 
253 See id. at 139. 
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under state trade secret law because it is not related to the product. 
This division accords with an intuition concerning the relationship 
between the secrets and the product. It makes little sense to say 
that the strategic plan is related to the cookie—the strategic plan is 
much more related to corporate governance and company 
management than it is to the cookie. 
E. Alternate Views on the Relationship Requirement: A ‘Federal 
Floor’ of Protection? 
There are two counterarguments to a narrow interpretation of 
the Relationship Requirement. The first is that the Theft of Trade 
Secrets Clarification Act of 2012 (the “TTSCA”),254 passed in the 
wake of Aleynikov, requires a broader interpretation of the 
Relationship Requirement. The second is that a narrow 
interpretation contravenes congressional intent to create a uniform 
law of trade secrets, and that the DTSA was designed to create a 
floor for trade secret protection, which states can augment—much 
the same way that the Lanham Act does for Trademarks. This 
Section examines both concerns, and rejects them. 
The TTSCA purported to expand the number of trade secrets 
subject to the EEA by removing the phrase “related to a product 
produced for or placed in [interstate commerce],” and replacing it 
with the current language “related to a product or service used in or 
intended for use in [interstate commerce].” 255  For starters, the 
TTSCA’s amendment of the EEA is only relevant to the extent that 
the EEA’s original jurisdictional element is relevant (which is not 
very). Primarily, there are significant textual and contextual 
reasons to interpret the Relationship Requirement narrowly. 256 
Namely, the TTSCA was a reaction to Aleynikov’s narrow reading 
of the EEA’s original Nexus Requirement, not the Relationship 
Requirement.257  Second,  even  if  the  TTSCA  superseded  and 
broadened Aleynikov’s implied interpretation of the Relationship 
                                                                                                             
254 Pub. L. No. 112-236, 126 Stat. 1627. 
255 18 U.S.C. 1832(a) (2012) (showing language as amended by the TTSCA, sec. 2, 
§ 1832(a), 126 Stat. 1627). 
256 See supra Sections III.A–B. 
257 See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
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Requirement,258 the interpretation proposed here is broader than 
Aleynikov. Assuming Congress intended the TTSCA to create an 
opposite result in analogous cases to Aleynikov, the direction of the 
value test is consistent with that intention. The high-frequency 
trading platform provided an economic service to Goldman Sachs’ 
clients.259 The secret (the source code) derived its value from the 
secrecy of the code (its efficiencies, its decision-making 
parameters,  etc.).260  Just  like  knowing  about  the  walnut  dust, 
knowing the source code diminished the value of the trading 
platform from the perspective of the competitors. Even if we take 
the TTSCA as evidence of Congress’s intent to broaden the 
jurisdictional element of the EEA, the interpretation this Article 
offers suffices. Thus, the TTSCA does not require a broader 
reading of the Relationship Requirement than proposed here. 
The legislative history of the DTSA provides a stronger, albeit 
ultimately flawed, justification for a broader interpretation of the 
Relationship Requirement. Generally, the purpose of the DTSA 
has been articulated as to create “uniformity” within trade secret 
law.261 On this view, the trade secret system established by the 
DTSA is much the same as the trademark system established by 
the Lanham Act: a floor of federal protection which states can 
augment. Undoubtedly, there is appeal in a system thus construed. 
However, in the words of Justice Kagan, we should “not . . . 
allow[] ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear  
statutory language.”262 
There are four principal reasons to reject this reading. First, this 
reading cherry-picks the legislative history in favor of uniformity. 
The price of uniformity in the trade secret system—as in the 
                                                                                                             
258 See supra notes 228, 237–40 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Pooler’s 
assertion that Aleynikov impliedly interpreted the relationship requirement of the EEA’s 
prior jurisdictional element). 
259 United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2012). 
260 Id. 
261 Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 4 (2016) (discussing the value of uniformity—not 
available under the UTSA—to businesses seeking to protect trade secrets); S. REP. NO. 
114-220, at 4 (2016) (indicating one of the key considerations of the committee was the 
“impact of a uniform Federal civil remedy”). That the Act intends to encourage 
uniformity is often a starting-point for criticism of the DTSA. See, e.g., Letter from 
Goldman et al., supra note 33, at 6–8; Seaman, supra note 33, at 359–62. 
262 Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1266. 
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trademark system—may in fact be preemption of state law. But the 
legislative history also reveals an intention to respect state trade 
secret laws.263 Congress couldn’t speak unequivocally in favor of 
uniformity at the same time that it clearly spoke in favor of the 
benefits of federalism. Additionally, the anti-preemption 
provision 264  and clear congressional forbearance in the Nexus 
Requirement265  provide textual warnings against privileging the 
“uniformity” legislative history. 
Second, although an analogous system to federal trademarks 
might be useful, this reading ignores the critical differences 
between the Lanham Act and the DTSA. For instance, the Lanham 
Act reaches all trademarks that “may lawfully be regulated by 
Congress,”266 while the DTSA forbears from the full exercise of 
congressional power.267 Furthermore, the Lanham Act explicitly 
displaces state trademark and unfair competition law, as far as it 
conflicts in certain ways with federally registered trademarks.268 
By contrast, the text of the DTSA preserves a role for the states in 
the trade secret system.269 
Third, there are significant normative reasons, relating to the 
efficiency of innovation-networks, to favor the two-tiered system 
presented here. Professor Laura Pedraza-Fariña’s recent work 
suggests that trade secret law, which creates different incentives 
for knowledge-workers and their managers, can slow 
innovation. 270   Specifically,  over-protection  of  “negative 
                                                                                                             
263 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 6 (“Carefully balanced to ensure an effective 
and efficient remedy for trade secret owners . . . , the legislation is designed to avoid 
disruption of legitimate businesses, without preempting State law.”); S. REP. NO. 114-
220, at 10. 
264 See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1838 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) 
(amending EEA, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b) (2012)). 
265 See supra Section II.E. 
266 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
267 See supra Section II.E. Even discounting the obvious congressional forbearance, the 
DTSA’s definition of interstate commerce is noticeably narrower than the Lanham Act’s. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
268 See 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b); see also id. § 1127; 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY 
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:4 (4th ed. 2017). 
269 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1838 (containing the anti-preemption provision). 
270 See generally Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Spill Your (Trade) Secrets: Knowledge 
Networks as Innovation Drivers, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561 (2017). 
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information”271  and  overly-rigid  fiduciary  duties  can  stifle 
knowledge-networks that produce innovation in hubs like Boston, 
San Diego, and Silicon Valley.272 She suggests that the optimal 
trade secret system would allow states the flexibility to experiment 
with different levels of protection for negative information and 
fiduciary duties.273 Thus, normatively, a two-tiered system creates 
better incentives than a ‘federal floor’ system by: (1) generally 
excluding negative information from federal protection,274 and (2) 
preserving the ability of states to vary the relationship between 
trade secrets and fiduciary duties. 
Fourth, there may be theoretical benefits to insisting on a two-
tiered system, as this Article advocates.275 The direction of value 
test generally distinguishes between technical trade secrets and 
business information, with technical trade secrets qualifying for 
federal protection because they are sufficiently related to a product 
or service. By focusing on secrets that add value to products and 
services, this interpretation helps to situate trade secrets in the 
panoply of federal intellectual property protection. Trade secrets 
have long been odd relatives of the other intellectual property 
rights, mainly because of competing theoretical justifications for 
protecting secrets (including tort, contract, property, commercial 
morality, and unfair competition).276 As Professor Mark Lemley 
points out, the other major intellectual property regimes have as 
their focus “inventive activity” and promotion of “disclosure of 
those inventions,” so that the public can benefit from the 
                                                                                                             
271 “Negative information” is knowledge about what is ineffective, or what does not 
work, or unfruitful research pathways, and states vary on whether such information is 
protectable. See, e.g., Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 270, at 1603–04. 
272 Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 270, at 1580. 
273 Id. at 1605. 
274 Although federal protection is likely to be highly fact-specific, it is likely that 
negative information is not sufficiently related to a product or service, as its primary 
benefit is to the research and development wing of a company. However, negative 
information occupies a gray area in the Relationship Requirement, and specific facts may 
indicate that the negative information lends extraordinary value to a product or service. 
See infra Conclusion, Section B (discussing the impact of the jurisdictional element  
on negative information). 
275 See infra Conclusion, Section A (discussing the theoretical foundations of federal 
trade secret law). 
276 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 3, at 1803; Lemley, supra note 3, at 312. 
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inventions.277  In  other  words,  the  other  intellectual  property 
regimes are outcome-oriented, and seek to maximize the public 
good derived in the market from inventive/creative activity. By 
federalizing trade secrets that have a sufficient relationship to 
market outputs (products and services), a narrow reading of the 
Relationship Requirement ensures that the theory of federal trade 
secret law runs in tandem to other federal intellectual property 
regimes.278 At the same time, trade secrets that are not directly 
connected to the incentive for invention can be protected by the 
states, each balancing protection of the information against its own 
tort, contract, commercial morality, and unfair competition law. 
In all, it is possible to take a broader interpretation of the 
Relationship Requirement, and thus create a trade secret system 
with a federal floor and state deviations. However, as discussed 
above, not only does such a reading give undue priority to certain 
legislative history over statutory text and ignore critical differences 
between the DTSA and the Lanham Act, but it also ignores key 
normative and theoretical reasons for preferring the two- 
tiered system. 
IV. TOWARD A TAXONOMY OF FEDERAL TRADE SECRETS 
As the preceding Sections indicate, the Qualifying Phrase of 
the DTSA narrows federally-actionable trade secrets to those trade 
secrets which satisfy the Relationship and Nexus Requirements. 
Other trade secrets remain protectable, if at all, only under state 
law. Starting from that insight, this Part begins the task of 
constructing a taxonomy for determining which trade secrets 
support action under the DTSA and which do not, as summarized 
in Figure 1. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
277 See Lemley, supra note 3, at 329. 
278 The Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. indicated that trade secret 
law is justified in part by the incentives it creates. 416 U.S. 470, 481–82 (1974). 
However, Kewanee also noted that a critical part of trade secret law was the 
“maintenance of standards of commercial ethics.” Id. at 481. 
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 Figure 1 
 
Columns A, B, and C indicate gradations of the flow in 
interstate commerce. A product or service may flow in interstate 
commerce, represent de minimis or possible future flow, or may 
not cross state lines at all. As discussed in Part III, the Relationship 
Requirement insists upon a close relationship between the product 
or service and the trade secret. Rows 1, 2, and 3 indicate how 
closely the trade secret is related to a product or service. The trade 
secret may be incorporated into the product or service, direct its 
value towards the product or service (i.e., be used in the 
manufacture of the product or service), or may direct its value 
elsewhere (i.e., to the firm in general). 
 NEXUS REQUIREMENT 
 Column A: 
Product or 
service flows 
in interstate 
commerce 
Column B: 
Future flow or 
slight flow 
across state 
lines 
Column C: 
Product or 
service does 
not cross state 
lines 
Row 1: 
Trade secret 
incorporated 
into product or 
service 
Actionable Likely Actionable 
Not 
Actionable 
Row 2: 
Trade secret 
directs value to 
product or 
service 
Likely 
Actionable 
It Depends Not Actionable 
Row 3: 
Trade secret 
directs value 
elsewhere 
Not 
Actionable 
Not 
Actionable 
Not 
Actionable 
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This Part explores the implications of the interpretation this 
Article advances. It proceeds in four sections, each of which 
develops and explores hypothetical cases. These examples are 
generalized and, for the purposes of this exercise, assumed to be 
valid trade secrets.279 Many—if not most—trade secrets will be 
actionable under the DTSA. Most products and services, for 
instance, will flow in interstate commerce in the modern economy. 
Likewise, a significant chunk of past trade secret litigation 
concerned “technical trade secrets”—i.e., trade secrets most likely 
to be incorporated in or direct value toward a product or service.280 
Furthermore, highly valuable trade secrets likely to be litigated will 
also likely be actionable. For instance, a recipe for a popular cola 
beverage281 or a recipe for breading fried chicken282 obviously both 
(1) provide direct value to a product, and (2) the product actually 
flows in interstate commerce. Through examining hypotheticals 
one can begin to develop a sense for the dividing lines and edge 
cases which will develop as the DTSA’s jurisdictional element  
is interpreted. 
However, protection for some trade secrets will be relegated to 
state law. The following three sections discuss the dividing line 
between protection under the DTSA and recourse under state law. 
It is important to keep in mind that not being actionable under the 
                                                                                                             
279 The exact contours of a federal trade secret have not been developed. However, it is 
assumed that at a high level of generality: (1) the trade secret must be secret (i.e., “not . . . 
generally known . . . [or] readily ascertainable”); (2) the trade secret must derive 
independent economic value from its secrecy; and (3) the owner must have taken 
reasonable precautions to maintain secrecy. See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3) (West, 
Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) (defining “trade secret”). More specifically, this 
Article assumes that all the examples below generate discernable value from  
their secrecy. 
280 Prior research demonstrates that between fifty-and-sixty percent of trade secrets 
litigated in federal court (in diversity) are “technical” (i.e., formulas, technical 
information, or computer programs). See Almeling et al., Federal Study, supra note 44, at 
304–05. In state courts, only a third of cases litigated technical trade secrets. See 
Almeling et al., State Study, supra note 44, at 60, 72–73. 
281 For instance, Coca-Cola’s formula. See Lionel Laurent, The Price of Coke’s Secrets, 
FORBES (May 23, 2007), https://www.forbes.com/2007/05/23/joya-williams-coke-face-
markets-cx_ll_0523autofacescan05.html#a85d0174102e [https://perma.cc/NV37-46M8]. 
282 For instance, KFC’s secret blend of herbs and spices. See Liam Stack, Is This the 
Top-Secret KFC Recipe?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08
/26/dining/is-this-the-top-secret-kfc-recipe.html [https://perma.cc/PTG3-U5DY]. 
2017]           THE DTSA'S FEDERALISM PROBLEM 51 
 
DTSA does not prevent recovery for misappropriation. Rather, it 
simply requires that those trade secrets are governed by state trade 
secret law. 
First, Section IV.A discusses the narrowing effect of the Nexus 
Requirement. The Nexus Requirement places a barrier between a 
plaintiff and suit based upon the movement of the product or 
service in interstate commerce.283 However, although the Nexus 
Requirement is narrower than similar “affecting commerce” 
language, it is not much narrower. Thus, in the interconnected 
modern internet economy, most trade secrets will satisfy the Nexus 
Requirement. The exceptions, though, are worth contemplating. 
Section IV.B then discusses the narrowing effect of the 
Relationship Requirement. This Article argues that a principled 
test for properly narrowing the Relationship Requirement finds that 
trade secrets are “related to” a product or service under the DTSA, 
so long as the value of the trade secret is directed at the product  
or service.284 
A. DTSA Step One: Defining Interstate Trade Secrets Under the 
Nexus Requirement 
The Nexus Requirement limits the DTSA to products and 
services that flow in interstate commerce. Simply affecting 
interstate commerce is not sufficient; the product or service must 
actually cross state lines. There are certain products or services that 
are entirely local and will fail to satisfy the Nexus Requirement. 
However, there are also difficult cases—involving de minimis and 
potential interstate flow—that are discussed below. 
1. Failing the Nexus Requirement 
Some trade secrets will fail the Nexus Requirement. Take the 
following two hypotheticals under consideration. 
* * * * * 
                                                                                                             
283 See supra Section II.E. 
284 See supra Section III.D. 
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Hypothetical: CleanRite. 285  CleanRite is a privately-owned 
janitorial service based in Los Angeles with approximately seven 
percent of the Los Angeles janitorial market, but has no clients 
outside of Los Angeles County. A vast majority of its janitors are 
hired from within the county, and almost all of its supplies are 
purchased from within California. The company does not solicit 
clients out of state, and its only out-of-state business calls and mail 
are sent to the Internal Revenue Service. CleanRite has rapidly 
expanded because its founder conceived a work-flow process 
which allows its janitors to work at almost twice the speed of 
comparable janitors with only half the training. CleanRite’s Chief 
Financial Officer quits, taking the details of this process with her to 
CleanRite’s chief competitor: Cleaners4Less. 
Hypothetical: The Warren Buffet.286 The Warren Buffet is a 
small buffet restaurant located in Nebraska. The Warren Buffet’s 
gimmick is that diners are provided complete privacy because of 
the hermetic nature of the booths. The buffet does not deliver, 
although it does source some of its ingredients from out of state. 
The owner, Fiver Rabbit, developed a process which allows him to 
only cook once a week yet provide fresh-tasting food. The process 
includes modified recipes, flash-freezing, special re-warming 
techniques, and lotus leaves. A rival buffet, astonished at the 
Warren Buffet’s ability to reduce chef labor costs, sent a spy to 
learn the secret. After months of working as a server and gaining 
Fiver’s trust, the spy succeeded in obtaining the secret. The rival 
buffet begins practicing the trade secret. 
* * * * * 
In the hypotheticals above, neither CleanRite nor the Warren 
Buffet actually uses their products or services in interstate 
commerce. The janitorial service is provided exclusively in 
California, and Warren Buffet does not serve meals outside 
Nebraska. Thus, their products and services do not flow in 
interstate commerce, and they cannot meet the  
Nexus Requirement. 
                                                                                                             
285 The facts of this hypothetical impute a trade secret into the facts of United States v. 
American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271, 273–75 (1975). 
286 The facts of this hypothetical are based loosely on Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 
965, 966–67 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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The first thing to note about the above hypotheticals is exactly 
how far one must constrain the activities of the company to fail the 
Nexus Requirement. Because the product or service itself must 
flow in interstate commerce, one need not go as far as the 
hypotheticals above. The limited extent to which it can be said to 
“affect” interstate commerce is insufficient. CleanRite might be 
able to hire its janitors from out of state, so long as the janitorial 
service does not cross state lines. Likewise, the Warren Buffet 
might be able to have out-of-state customers and procure out-of-
state ingredients, so long as it does not deliver or franchise out  
of state. 
Regardless, this exercise makes clear the Nexus Requirement’s 
low bar. Given the realities of modern commerce, very few 
products and only slightly more services will be truly intrastate; 
for example, recipes for local dishes. However, one can imagine 
relatively large businesses that do not offer their services—at 
least—in interstate commerce. Janitorial services are one; others 
might include gardening, roofing, construction, and other labor-
intensive services. If the defendant can prove that the plaintiff is 
wholly involved in intrastate commerce, the Nexus Requirement 
cannot be satisfied. 
2. The Dividing Line: When Does an Intrastate Product or 
Service Become Interstate? 
The following two hypotheticals test the boundary of the 
Nexus Requirement. The first hypothetical speaks directly to the 
point at which one can consider a product or service to be “used 
in” interstate commerce. Specifically, the question arises whether 
de minimis movement in interstate commerce satisfies the Nexus 
Requirement. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board recently 
found that de minimis sale (of two hats) in interstate commerce 
failed the Lanham Act’s definition of “in commerce.”287 But the 
Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Lanham Act’s definition 
of “commerce”—“all commerce which may lawfully be regulated 
by Congress”288—reached the full extent of Congress’s commerce 
                                                                                                             
287 See Christian Faith Fellowship Church v. Adidas AG, 841 F.3d 986, 987–88 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (discussing the basis of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s decision). 
288 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
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clause power, and therefore captured even de minimis movement 
in commerce.289 Because the Nexus Requirement does not reach 
the full extent of Congress’s power,290 one must query whether de 
minimis interstate connection qualifies under the  
Nexus Requirement. 
The second hypothetical raises the question of the extent to 
which a product or service is “intended for use in”  
interstate commerce. 
* * * * * 
Hypothetical: Goodbye, Partner. 291  Les Poplar and Andy 
Aspen founded Aspen & Poplar, LLP after graduating from law 
school. Both Poplar and Aspen are licensed to practice law only in 
California and ninety percent of their business is in California state 
court (the other ten percent is in the federal district courts of 
California on diversity cases). The two attorneys rarely practice 
law outside of the state of California, although some of their clients 
are domiciled in states other than California. They rarely appear in 
court outside of California. In only a few cases has either of the 
two partners maintained a diversity action outside the state to argue 
that the case should be transferred to or remain in California. For a 
variety of reasons, Aspen decided to part ways with Poplar, and 
they dissolved their partnership amicably. Shortly after dissolving 
their partnership, Poplar learned that many of his top clients have 
been secreted away by Aspen, despite his understanding that their 
dissolution agreement left all the clients to him. Poplar brings a 
suit under the DTSA to protect his client lists. 
Hypothetical: New England Roofers, Inc.292 Terry Roo and Ben 
Fers founded Terry & Ben Roofers in Boston in 1990. The 
company has enjoyed commercial success because in 1989 they 
invented a roofing tar that lasts twenty percent longer than their 
                                                                                                             
289 See Christian Faith Fellowship, 841 F.3d at 990–94. 
290 See supra Section II.E. 
291 The facts of this hypothetical are loosely based upon Complaint at 3–5, Mahamedi v. 
Paradice, No. 16-cv-02805 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2016). Poplar’s case also fails because 
the trade secret (a client list) is not sufficiently related to the service. See infra  
Section IV.B. 
292 The facts of this hypothetical are loosely based upon the facts of Morlife, Inc. v. 
Perry, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1514 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
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competitors’ roofing tar. They discovered the formula while 
experimenting with an expired patent and found that adding 
brewed English tea to the tar greatly improved the tar’s longevity. 
The pair opted for trade secret protection, rather than seeking to 
patent their invention. In 2015, as part of an expansionary business 
plan, they reincorporated under the name New England Roofers, 
Inc. The 2015 business plan called for a five-year effort to expand 
their business into Maine, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New 
Hampshire. The plan included aggressive marketing in the target 
states, attendance at out-of-state networking events, mass mailers, 
and cold calls to prospective clients. Although their strategic plan 
is going well, they have not yet landed an out-of-state client. Their 
Marketing Director, Brad Guy (who has never mixed tar in his 
life), recently downloaded the secret tar recipe from a confidential 
server, quit his job, and has been hired by New England Roofer’s 
primary competitor as “Chief Tar Director.” 
* * * * * 
The challenge in both hypotheticals is the tension between 
formalism and functionalism: exactly how “interstate” can a 
product or service be before it satisfies the Nexus Requirement? 
Viewing the Nexus Requirement functionally has the advantage of 
preserving federalism interests and engendering a robust reading of 
the anti-preemption provision of the DTSA. Formalism presents a 
cleaner, if under-inclusive, rule. 
Poplar’s hypothetical presents the federalism issue directly. 
Poplar is licensed to practice law only in California and his 
practice is largely confined to California. The partnership was a 
California partnership, governed by California fiduciary law. The 
only provision of Poplar’s legal services that were rendered out of 
state included services designed to keep his practice of law within 
the state of California or included services ancillary to the practice 
of law in California (such as taking depositions). Yet the formalist 
would point out that he provides his service across state lines. A 
rule that allows de minimis interstate movement to satisfy the 
Nexus Requirement endangers federalizing, in this instance, state 
partnership law. The conflict is essentially one between two 
California citizens concerning dissolution of a California 
partnership that rendered services almost entirely in California. 
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The fiduciary duty owned by Aspen to Poplar—along with the 
question of whether the particular client lists even qualify as 
property of the partnership—appears to be best suited for 
resolution by California state law in California state courts. Thus, 
the question arises whether federalism interests outweigh de 
minimis interstate movement of Poplar’s services. For those who 
take federalism and the anti-preemption section of the DTSA 
seriously, perhaps the Nexus Requirement should tolerate a small 
degree of interstate commerce. 
The New England Roofer’s hypothetical poses a different 
quandary: how to deal with a professed intent to engage in 
interstate commerce. The Nexus Requirement includes the 
language “used in, or intended for use in, interstate . . . 
commerce.”293 The intent language poses a problem. On the one 
hand, “intended for use” may point to the subjective intent of the 
trade secret owner. On this reading, the query turns to the indicia 
of that intent: How concrete must the intent be? Must the 
opportunity to engage in interstate commerce be realistic? What 
factors help the court discern whether an intention is professed to 
take advantage of the federal act or whether an intention is sincere? 
For the New England Roofer’s, this subjective intent is likely met. 
Terry and Ben obviously intend for their service to flow in 
interstate commerce: the ambition has been memorialized in a 
business plan; they have engaged in extensive marketing; and they 
are actively soliciting out-of-state clients. However, if one squints, 
it may be hard to distinguish this case from that of Poplar because 
there is no service in the flow of interstate commerce, and there are 
no out-of-state clients. Certainly, the rule cannot be so flexible to 
allow Poplar simply to plead intent to practice law out of state, and 
gain protection for what has heretofore been an asset of a 
California partnership. 
On the other hand, perhaps the language “or intended for use 
in” interstate commerce is meant to reinforce the breadth of 
congressional power asserted. Congressional authority does not 
only exist at state lines, but also crosses into the interior of states to 
                                                                                                             
293 DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) 
(emphasis added). 
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reach items in the flow of interstate commerce before they reach 
state lines, or after they cross state lines, but before they reach their 
destination. 294  Perhaps the “intend for” language reinforces 
Congress’s intent to capture products and services prepared for 
interstate commerce which have not yet flowed across a state line. 
This assessment of “intended for use” would require proof that a 
product or service is in interstate commerce but simply hasn’t 
reached another state yet. Under this reading, Terry and Fred’s 
subjective intent to engage in interstate commerce might not 
provide their trade secrets federal protection until they have 
actually obtained a client in another state. Between the formation 
of their subjective intent and the retention of an out-of-state client, 
the Nexus Requirement may not be satisfied. However, between 
the retention of the out-of-state client and provision of services to 
that client, the services are sufficiently intended to be in the flow 
of interstate commerce. 
Although this reading might seem harsh or the timing of 
protection might seem arbitrary, it implicates the same federalism 
interests as the de minimis flow in interstate commerce. Up until 
the intention becomes imminent and realistic, Jerry and Fred’s 
trade secret is an asset of a Massachusetts corporation that has 
never left the state: it seems ripe for resolution by Massachusetts 
law rather than federal law. Furthermore, requiring objective 
indicia of interstate flow of a good or service serves the judicial 
economy. Subjective intention can be fabricated to gain access to 
federal protection. Hence, leaving the state law cases to the state 
courts in the first instance is preferable. 
3. Nexus Requirement Summary 
Our hypotheticals teach two important lessons. First, a service 
is more likely to be exclusively local than a product: a service can 
be more easily confined to a geographic location, while most 
products in the age of the Internet flow across state lines. Simply, 
trade secrets that relate to products are more likely to satisfy the 
Nexus Requirement. Of course, products that are limited to 
intrastate commerce for legal or regulatory reasons, almost by 
                                                                                                             
294 See, e.g., McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 648–54 (1982). 
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definition, cannot satisfy the requirement because they are entirely 
intrastate. On a broad reading of the provision (one that maximizes 
the number of trade secrets given federal protection), only those 
products or services that absolutely do not flow in interstate 
commerce would fail the Nexus Requirement. In the examples 
above, only CleanRite would fail to satisfy the requirement. On a 
slightly narrower reading of the provision—which affords fewer 
trade secrets federal protection—hyper local products such as craft 
beer and meals in restaurants might not qualify for protection, so 
long as they are not sold across state lines (for example, the 
Warren Buffet). This slightly narrower reading might allow 
interstate provision of raw ingredients, if the final product did not 
flow in interstate commerce. But it does open the door to the 
question: How much interstate flow will the Nexus  
Requirement tolerate? 
The answer is the second lesson: the breadth or narrowness of 
Nexus Provision will depend upon the weight given to federalism 
and anti-preemption concerns. As seen in the Goodbye Partner 
hypothetical,295 a tolerance for slight interstate flow of a product or 
service may serve federalism’s values by relegating to state courts 
interaction between state trade secret law and state partnership or 
fiduciary law. Trade secrets are intimately connected with other 
areas of state public policy, including fiduciary duties, contract, 
and employment mobility. The removal of some of these cases to 
federal court presents challenges to state systems that have struck 
separate balances between the protection of trade secrets and other 
public policies—most notably, California’s balance between 
employee mobility and trade secret protection in its rejection of the 
inevitable  disclosure  doctrine.296  Respecting  these  state-law 
balances requires relegating certain causes to state courts for 
determination.297  In Poplar’s case, for instance, the question of 
whether the client list qualifies as a trade secret is a question of 
                                                                                                             
295 See supra Section IV.A.2. 
296 See FLIR Sys. v. Parrish, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1277 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) 
(rejecting the inevitable disclosure doctrine as contrary to CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§ 16600 (West, Westlaw through ch. 859 of 2017 Reg. Sess.)). 
297 Legislative history, for what it is worth, suggests that Congress intended to respect 
the balances struck between trade secret and other state law. H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 14 
(2016); S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10 (2016). 
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California trade secret law. And, if the client list does not qualify 
as property of the partnership, then it would be difficult to argue 
that Aspen failed his fiduciary duties to hold “property” of the 
partnership in trust,298 or that he failed a fiduciary duty to avoid a 
“knowing violation of the law” in winding up the partnership.299 
But, the federal court is not required to follow California’s 
determination about whether a client list qualifies as a trade secret 
if the DTSA authorizes federal courts to define a federal trade 
secret. Thus, California law and federal law may give the same 
information different status as property; a result that might upset 
California’s balance between state fiduciary and trade secret law. 
To the extent society wants to preserve a role for primarily local 
trade secrets to be governed by state law and not pre-empted by 
federal common law, society should tolerate de minimis interstate 
movement of goods and services. 
B. The DTSA Step Two: The Relationship Requirement 
Determining whether a trade secret’s value is directed at a 
product or service is a highly-fact specific inquiry. To explore the 
test developed in this Article, this Section analyzes hypotheticals 
where the value of the trade secret is directed (and is not directed) 
at a product or service. The result demonstrates how trade secrets 
incorporated into products or services and technical trade secrets 
are clearly actionable under the DTSA. General business 
information, however, likely will not qualify. 
1. Satisfying the Relationship Requirement 
This Section explores how the direction of the value delineates 
the relationship between the trade secret and the product or service. 
* * * * * 
Hypothetical: Mrs. Dolly, Co.300 Margery Dolly designs dolls. 
She has decades of experience in the doll industry tracking trends 
                                                                                                             
298 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 16404(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 859 of 2017 
Reg. Sess.). 
299 Id. § 16404(c). 
300 This hypothetical is based loosely on an Order granting in part and denying in-part 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Shapiro v. Hasbro Inc., No. 2:15-cv-02964-
BRO (AJWx), 2016 WL 9176559 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2016). 
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and developing designs. She’s an independent contractor who has 
worked with the biggest doll manufacturers. Her company, Mrs. 
Dolly, Co., is highly sought after as a market consultant in the doll 
industry. In the doll industry, the first-mover advantage of a good 
product guarantees market dominance. Dolly had a meeting with 
the doll-manufacturing company Little Princess, in which she 
pitched a centaur-like doll targeted at young boys. The pitch and 
the doll design were based on her assessment of the doll market. 
She provided Little Princess with a mock-up of the doll, and a 
PowerPoint presentation explaining how to market and price the 
doll, in order to take advantage of the current hole in the market. 
The PowerPoint presentation included market research, concept, 
pricing, focus group research, and trend analyses. Little Princess 
declined to move forward with Dolly. However, within months (in 
general accord with Dolly’s marketing advice) Little Princess 
released a nearly identical doll at the price point revealed by Dolly. 
Hypothetical: GrainMax.301 GrainMax is a large corporation 
that provides a range of products and services to farmers in the 
United States and across the world. One of GrainMax’s products is 
a digital tool that helps farmers know when, where, and in what 
quantity to plant crops to attain a specified yield. The company 
keeps this digital tool updated by utilizing a variety of algorithms 
and collections of information about the efficiency of the tools. 
One of GrainMax’s employees used his computer to download 
parts of the algorithms and representative samples of information. 
This employee has been hired by GrainMax’s primary competitor. 
* * * * * 
Both examples fall within the Relationship Requirement. Mrs. 
Dolly’s market analysis, know-how, focus-group results, and 
mock-ups are integral to the design of the final doll product. Mrs. 
Dolly clears the Relationship Requirement regardless of whether 
one considers the product (a doll) or the service (her consulting). 
The value of the trade secret comes from a combination of first-
mover advantage, branding, and unique market research. The 
                                                                                                             
301 This hypothetical is based loosely on Complaint at 2–5, Monsanto Co. v. Chen, No. 
4:16-cv-876 (E.D. Mo. June 16, 2016), dismissed in part, No. 4:16-cv-00876-CDP (E.D. 
Mo. Dec. 22, 2016), and injunction granted in part, No. 4:16-cv-00876-CDP (E.D. Mo. 
Dec. 23, 2016). 
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competitor doll manufacturer would value the doll less if this 
information is generally known because it would be able to steal 
the first-mover advantage, brand, or research insights. A 
competitor consultant would value this information because it 
would lower the distinctive quality of Mrs. Dolly’s  
consulting service. 
The GrainMax example works in roughly the same manner. 
The digital tool is a product. The algorithm and information, if 
they become generally known, lower the value of the digital tool in 
the eyes of GrainMax’s competitors, who now can better 
approximate the accuracy of the tool. The algorithm and 
information are related to the digital tool sufficiently to satisfy the 
Relationship Requirement. While what was taken was only partial, 
it necessarily impacts the intrinsic value of the digital tool (and 
continued subscription to it). Thus, while it may not be directly 
connected to the design or working of the digital tool itself, the 
trade secret information satisfies the Relationship Requirement. 
2. Failing the Relationship Requirement 
The following hypotheticals indicate how the direction of a 
trade secret’s value may indicate that a trade secret fails the 
Relationship Requirement. 
* * * * * 
Hypothetical: Halifax.302 Halifax is a consulting company that 
provides services to public and private entities across the country. 
Halifax helps companies develop business rules. The President, 
CEO, and sole-shareholder of Halifax, Mary Halifax, has decided 
to sell her company. To that end, she and one of her employees 
developed a “valuation packet.” This valuation packet includes 
customer-specific price points for Halifax services, end-dates of 
contracts, contract terms, and contact information. It also includes 
sensitive financial data and future strategies for the business. The 
employee who helped develop the valuation packet, Martin Treble, 
absconded with the valuation packet. He has set up meetings, 
claiming to be an owner of Halifax, with companies seeking to 
                                                                                                             
302 This hypothetical is based loosely on Complaint, Truepenny People LLC v. Cota, 
No. 3:16-cv-00424-MCR-CJK (N.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2016). 
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acquire Halifax. Halifax alleges that the valuation packet is the 
trade secret. 
Hypothetical: BetterScore.303 BetterScore monitors consumer’s 
use of credit and provides identity protection and credit monitoring 
products. BetterScore has spent millions of dollars developing a 
web platform from which consumers can access their credit scores 
online. Because of the enormity of the project, BetterScore hired 
another company to manage development of the source code for its 
web platform. Terrance Lions was this company’s project manager 
for the BetterScore web platform. After significant work, Lions 
posted the code in a public location online, from which others 
could download the web platform and use for their own purposes. 
* * * * * 
The Relationship Requirement first requires that the plaintiff 
identify the product or service and then identify the trade secret.304 
For Halifax, the service is their consulting services; the trade secret 
is the valuation packet. For BetterScore, the products and services 
derive from their credit monitoring and identify protection; the 
trade secret is the source code for the web platform. Once 
identified, the analysis turns to whether the value of identified 
trade secret is directed at the identified product or service. 
For both Halifax and BetterScore, there is insufficient 
proximity to satisfy the Relationship Requirement. Take Halifax 
first. The valuation packet has a value in its secrecy. The packet 
heavily informs Halifax’s minimum sale value. In negotiations 
with potential acquirers, the valuation packet informs the positions 
taken by Halifax and may represent the best alternative to sale. 
Although it includes significant information about the services 
provided (price points and profit margins, for instance), the value 
of the secret is not directed at those services. If the information 
were to become public, competitors of Halifax would know the 
profit margin of the services, but not how to provide more 
competitive services. Thus, the revelation would not affect the 
valuation of Halifax services by its competitors. The value of the 
                                                                                                             
303 This hypothetical is based loosely on Complaint, Consumerinfo.com, Inc. v. Leon, 
No. 8:16-cv-01261-DOC-KES (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016). 
304 See DTSA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61). 
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secret is not targeted at the service, but rather at the company (i.e., 
the value of the company). 
BetterScore’s situation is similar. The web platform provides 
value to BetterScore. The back-end of a website represents a 
considerable investment, and the website may make access to the 
products and services easier. The web platform could be a valuable 
asset of BetterScore, perhaps even differentiating it as a company 
from its competitors enough to justify a higher market price for its 
product. However, the web platform does not change the value to 
ScoreWatch’s competitors of the products and services it supplies 
(i.e., its credit monitoring and identity protection). Instead, it 
simply makes the display of these items easier and more accessible 
to customers. A display case does not increase the intrinsic value 
of the diamond it houses. Revelation of the back-end of the website 
does not lower the value to BetterScore’s competitors of the 
products and services it provides. 
Thus, neither the valuation packet nor the web platform is 
sufficiently related to the products or services to satisfy the 
Relationship Requirement. This result fits well with intuition. For 
instance, one might be able to articulate how the valuation packet 
or website are “related to” the products and services involved. 
However, they seem to be more related to other aspects of the 
business. Thus, a valuation packet may include information about 
a product or service, but it seems more related to the sale of the 
business than to the specific product or service. Furthermore, a 
website may display information about a product or service, but it 
seems to be better categorized—alongside the product or service—
as an independent asset of the corporation. For instance, the 
website may be just as valuable displaying a different product. It 
therefore seems more related to the business than it does to  
any product. 
3. Relationship Requirement Summary 
As the hypotheticals above indicate, the Relationship 
Requirement generally tends to favor technical trade secrets rather 
than general business information. The distinction between these 
two types of trade secrets is too crude to be helpful as a general 
matter. For instance, it will be insufficient to label a strategic plan 
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“general business information” and exclude it from protection 
under the DTSA. The strategic plan could have specific 
information on it, such as a formula or a manufacturing process, 
which is deserving of protection. However, in such a situation it is 
important to note that it is not the strategic plan which receives 
protection, but the information contained within it. However, at a 
general level, the distinction helps to visualize the impact of the 
Relationship Requirement: it protects technical trade secrets and 
leaves general business information to state courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The DTSA did not federalize all trade secrets. Parts II and III 
of this Article provided a principled basis for concluding that the 
jurisdictional nexus of the DTSA narrows application of the statute 
to trade secrets which direct their value to a product or service that 
actually flows in interstate commerce. As the Article explored in 
Part IV, the jurisdictional nexus operates to exclude some trade 
secrets—namely trade secrets regarding general business 
information—while protecting other trade secrets—namely 
technical trade secrets. These are the two primary contributions of 
this Article to the literature: the DTSA has a narrow jurisdictional 
element which generally federalizes technical trade secrets, while 
leaving general business information to state regulation. 
This conclusion explores the theoretical implications of the 
DTSA’s jurisdictional hook. In short, there are two: the theoretical 
foundations of federal trade secret law, and developing differences 
between state and federal trade secret law. A quick overview of 
these implications rounds out the Article and highlights the stakes 
presented by this Article’s interpretation of the Qualifying Phrase. 
A. The Theoretical Foundations of Federal Trade Secret Law 
The jurisdictional element brings federal trade secret theory 
more into line with other federal intellectual property theories. 
Traditionally, state trade secret law has suffered from crisis of 
theoretical foundation.305 The basic problem with state trade secret 
                                                                                                             
305 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 3, at 1803–10. 
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theory has been whether to justify the cause of action as a tort 
right, a contract right, or a property right. It has elements of all 
three, as well as complex elements of commercial morality 
interspersed with employment law. Viewing trade secret as 
intellectual property can solve many of these problems, 306  but 
sometimes unsatisfactorily and not entirely.307 But, federal trade 
secret law may not suffer the same theoretical deficiencies because 
it insists on a proximate connection between the trade secret and a 
product or service.308 That connection aligns federal trade secret 
theory with the incentive-and-disclosure regime commonly thought 
to motivate patent and copyright. Federal trade secret law provides 
incentives toward inventive activity through protecting useful 
(read: valuable) trade secrets from the perspective of increasing the 
provision of products and services. Of course, “disclosure” sits 
uncomfortably with “secrets.” But by protecting those trade secrets 
integral to products and services, federal trade secret law 
encourages greater production of those products and services (and 
thus greater use of the valuable knowledge).309 Of course, elements 
of contract and commercial morality—inherently present in the 
DTSA’s  definition  of  “misappropriation”310—complicate  this 
theoretical landscape.311 But, the focus on economic output (goods 
and services) puts federal trade secret law much more in line with 
traditional federal intellectual property justifications. 
B. The DTSA Is Not a Federal “Version” of State Trade  
Secret Law 
The jurisdictional element makes it impossible to view the 
DTSA simply as a federal “version” of state trade secret law. The 
two are different beasts. The jurisdictional element will have 
theoretical impact on other aspects of trade secret law over and 
                                                                                                             
306 See generally Lemley, supra note 3. 
307 See Bone, supra note 3, at 1803–04. 
308 See DTSA § 1836(b)(1). 
309 See supra notes 270–78 and accompanying text. 
310 See DTSA § 1839(5) (showing how misappropriation includes, inter alia, violation 
of un-defined “duties” and “improper means”—both of which include elements of 
contract and commercial morality). 
311 Indeed, Kewanee does not completely solve this issue. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481–82 (1974) (grounding trade secret protection in both 
maintenance of corporate morality and inventive incentives). 
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above excluding or including trade secrets. Two simple examples 
will demonstrate this, and both deal with the definition of “trade 
secret.”312  First is “negative information,” which is information 
concerning ineffective uses or research dead ends.313 Protection of 
negative information varies state to state,314 and federal protection 
is not clear. Although negative information can definitively have 
value, information about what not to do is likely not sufficiently 
connected to a product or service.315 Thus, the definition of “trade 
secret” has to be read through the lens of whether that trade secret 
qualifies for protection under the DTSA. 
The second example is more consequential: “continuous use.” 
Originally, trade secrets had to be in continuous use before they 
were protectable.316 However, the Uniform Trade Secret Act of 
1985 rejected the continuous use requirement,317 and most states 
have followed along.318 The jurisdictional element of the DTSA on 
the other hand, seems to clearly contemplate actual use of the trade 
secret. By requiring an actual link to a product or service, and by 
requiring that product or service to be actually flowing in 
commerce, the DTSA excludes from federal protection unused 
trade secrets. Thus, simple development and ownership of a trade 
secret—without any actualization—is not sufficient to qualify for 
                                                                                                             
312 Section 1839(3) of the DTSA states: 
‘[T]rade secret’ means all forms and types of financial, business, 
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including 
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, 
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or 
codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, 
compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, 
photographically, or in writing if— 
it is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy, it has value because of its 
secrecy, and is not readily ascertainable. 
313 See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
314 Compare Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 270, at 1603–04, with Cinebase Software, Inc. 
v. Media Guar. Trust, Inc., No. C98-1100EMS, 1998 WL 661465, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
22, 1998) (interpreting California law as protecting negative information). 
315 Negative information will likely be a case-by-case inquiry under the DTSA, as one 
can also see how information about what not to do can be exceptionally valuable to  
a service. 
316 See 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 5:7 (2008–2017). 
317 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1979) (amended 1985). 
318 JAGER, supra note 316 (collecting cases). 
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protection under the DTSA. This is a significant deviation from 
state law. 
These two examples underscore the importance of the 
jurisdictional element in constructing a two-tier system of trade 
secret protection. But, more importantly, the jurisdictional element 
establishes an independent system of trade secret protection. More 
examples will be forthcoming as the DTSA matures, but at the 
outset it is important to note how the DTSA as a whole must be 
read through the prism of the jurisdictional element, requiring first 
a proximate connection between the trade secret and a product or 
service, and second, the actual flow of that product or service in 
interstate commerce. 
 
